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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In Bandemer v. Ford Motor Company,1 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court recognized specific personal jurisdiction over Ford Motor Company 
because the “substantial connection between the defendant Ford, the forum 
Minnesota, and the claims brought . . . suffice[d] to establish specific 
personal jurisdiction over the company.”2 The court held that a Minnesota 
court had specific personal jurisdiction over Ford because of its targeted 
advertising, sales, and marketing in the state.3  
This Paper begins with a brief history of Minnesota’s approach to 
personal jurisdiction and the underlying justifications that led to the 
Bandemer decision.4 The facts and procedural history of Bandemer follow.5 
The analysis of this Paper considers two opposing opinions. The first 
opinion argues that Bandemer, on its face, is consistent with International 
Shoe,6 as well as the evolution of personal jurisdiction analysis.7 
Additionally, the decision in Bandemer supports the efficiency of the court.8 
Next, the second opinion argues that the court erred in granting specific 
personal jurisdiction because Ford’s contacts with Minnesota were not 
targeted actions, but general conduct.9 This analysis focuses on the first three 
factors in Minnesota’s five-pronged test for satisfying federal due process. 
This Paper was researched and written prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bandemer on March 25, 2021. As such, the Supreme 
Court’s decision and analysis are not considered in this Paper. However, 
                                                           
ǂ Kevin Deno is a 2L full-time student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He graduated 
from Macalester in 2011 with B.A. in Classics and now focuses on intellectual property, 
business, and employment law. 
ǂ ǂ John-Paul Dees is a 2L full-time student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. He graduated 
from St. Thomas in 2016 with a B.A. in Operations and Supply Chain Management and 
now focuses on health and business law. 
1 Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019). 
2 Id. at 755. 
3 Id.  
4 See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
5 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
6 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
7 See discussion infra Parts IV-V. 
8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They should be construed, 
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
9 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(requiring more than general connections for specific personal jurisdiction). 
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the Supreme Court ultimately held that Ford was properly subject to specific 
personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and Montana.10 
II. HISTORY 
Personal jurisdiction is one of several mechanisms guiding civil 
procedure that plays a critical “role in many civil disputes in the United 
States.”11 When a “defendant resides in, [or] is incorporated or 
headquartered in . . . the particular state where the suit is brought, personal 
jurisdiction generally is found to exist and is unproblematic.”12 However, 
problems generally “arise when a plaintiff sues the defendant in a state other 
than the one in which the defendant is located.”13 
A. Brief Overview of General Personal Jurisdiction and Specific Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant requires proper service to 
the “defendant in the state in which the court sits, and the defendant needs 
to voluntarily appear in court.”14 Personal jurisdiction is commonly 
established through either general personal jurisdiction15 or specific personal 
jurisdiction.16 “General [personal] jurisdiction may be amenable to narrowly 
defined categories, [however] specific [personal] jurisdiction is not.”17 
Additionally, personal jurisdiction can be waived, and if a defendant appears 
in court without objecting to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, 
                                                           
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court et al., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 
(2021) (holding that the connection between the claims and Ford’s in state activities were 
sufficient for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in both Minnesota and Montana).  
11 Robert E. Pfeffer, A 21st Century Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 13 U. N.H. L. REV. 
65, 66 (2015). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Personal Jurisdiction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
personal_jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/CP5T-9JFN]. 
15 General Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A court's authority to 
hear a wide range of cases, civil or criminal, that arise within its geographic area.”). General 
jurisdiction is also known as all-purpose jurisdiction. 
16 Specific Personal Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Jurisdiction 
based on a person’s minimum contacts with the forum state when the claim arises out of or 
is related to those contacts.”). Specific personal jurisdiction is also known as conduct-linked 
jurisdiction. 
17 Brief for Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Ford 
Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1902363, 
at *1 [hereinafter Brief for Civil Procedure Professors]. 
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“then the court will assume that the defendant is waiving any challenge to 
personal jurisdiction.”18 
General personal jurisdiction is properly asserted by a court over 
an out-of-state corporation “when the corporation’s affiliations with the State 
in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render it 
essentially at home in the forum State.’”19 An individual is “at home” in the 
state that is his or her domicile,20 whereas a corporation is “at home” in its 
state of incorporation “and in the state that is [its] principal place of 
business.”21 
Specific personal jurisdiction considers two factors: (1) “the extent 
of the contacts,” which must comport with the requirements dictated within 
the forum’s long-arm statute;22 and (2) “the relation between defendants’ 
contacts” and the forum state.23 In a case involving specific personal 
jurisdiction, each claim must be evaluated using the aforementioned 
factors.24 Furthermore,  a single or occasional action within a state might be 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if the action is sufficiently related 
to the suit.25 In practice, “specific [personal] jurisdiction has been a far more 
flexible inquiry into the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and 
the dispute.”26  
Additionally, the relationship between the forum, the defendant, 
and the dispute requires an analysis of the defendant’s rights in relation to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 The Due Process 
                                                           
18 Personal Jurisdiction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal 
_jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/CP5T-9JFN]; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). 
19 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). A foreign corporation is either a literal 
corporation located in a foreign country or a corporation that is headquartered or domiciled 
in a sister-state of the United States. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. 915. 
20 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (Rachel E. Barkow 
et al. eds., 10th ed. 2019); see also Domicile, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“The place at which a person has been physically present and that the person regards as 
home; a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home . . .” or “[t]he residence of a 
person or corporation for legal purposes.”). 
21 YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20 at 85; see also Corporate Domicile, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The place considered by law as the center of corporate affairs, 
where the corporation’s functions are discharged; the legal home of a corporation, usu[ally] 
its state of incorporation or the state in which it maintains its principal place of business.”). 
22 YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20 at 85; JOHN T. CROSS, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON & 
ELLEN E. DEASON, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES, PROBLEMS, AND EXERCISES 68 (4th ed. 2016). 
23 YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 85. 
24 Id. at 86. 
25Id.; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
26 Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 1. 
27 CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 68. 
4
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 8
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/8
1168 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Clause establishes the boundaries for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.28 
However, state legislatures have tightened these limitations through their 
own long-arm statutes.29  These long-arm statutes allow plaintiffs to serve 
process on non-resident defendants who are not physically present within 
the forum state.30 
There are two types of long-arm statutes: laundry-list long-arm 
statutes and due process long-arm statutes.31 Essentially, laundry-list long-
arm statutes list activities that the forum state’s legislature decided will 
subject non-resident defendants to the forum’s jurisdiction.32 If the 
defendant’s conduct falls within the parameters of the laundry-list long-arm 
statute, then a plaintiff may serve the defendant with process.33 Yet, even if 
the court can exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant through 
the laundry-list long-arm statute, this exercise may fail because exercising 
jurisdiction may not comply with the Due Process Clause’s notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.34 Thus, laundry-list long-arm statutes utilize a 
two-step analysis to exercise jurisdiction; first checking the statute’s listed 
activities, then checking for constitutional due process.35 
Conversely, due process long-arm statutes permit courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to limits allowed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 For example, 
California’s code states, “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on 
any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.”37 Other states have more verbose statutes, like Rhode Island’s:  
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident 
of this state or his executor or administrator, and every 
partnership or association, composed of any person or 
persons, not such residents, that shall have the necessary 
minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and 
the courts of this state shall hold such foreign corporations 
and such nonresident individuals or their executors or 
administrators, and such partnerships or associations 
                                                           
28 Id. 
29 See id. (“It is left to local legislatures within each state to grant power to its courts to exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction through long-arm statutes.”). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 68–69. 
32 See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 68. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 70 ( “Analysis under the due process long-arm and constitutional long-arm is 
identical.”). 
36 Id. at 69. 
37 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2018). 
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amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary 
to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United 
States.38  
By having a due process long-arm statute, states reduce the two-step 
analysis of long-arm statutes into a single step because the due process 
analysis operates under these statutes as required by a constitutional 
analysis.39 Like long-arm statutes, even if the non-resident defendant has 
contacts with the forum state, the defendant can establish that jurisdiction is 
unreasonable by showing it violates notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.40 To determine if a defendant has made this showing, courts analyze 
five factors, including the litigation’s burden on the defendant, the plaintiff’s 
interest in the litigation, the forum state’s interest in the claim, an efficient 
resolution to the issues resulting from the claim, and the maintenance of 
interstate social policies.41  
Like California and Rhode Island, Minnesota exercises specific 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a long-arm 
statute.42 Minnesota’s statute states that:  
As to the cause of arising from any acts enumerated in this 
subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the 
subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, or the 
individual’s personal representative, in the same manner as 
if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a 
resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or 
through an agent, the foreign corporation or nonresident 
individual: (1) owns, uses or possesses any real property 
situated in this state; or (2) transacts any business within the 
state . . . .43 
Unlike California or Rhode Island, Minnesota exercises specific 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a laundry-list 
long-arm statute with enumerated acts.44 However, even though Minnesota 
exercises jurisdiction over non-resident defendants through a laundry-list 
                                                           
38 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (2018). 
39 See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Analysis under the due process 
long-arm and constitutional long-arm is identical.”). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdiv. 1 (2018) (stating that Minnesota’s long-arm statute 
operates through a list of enumerated acts and under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
43 Id. 
44 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (2018) (stating California’s due process long-arm 
statute without listing enumerated acts); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (2018) (stating 
Rhode Island’s due process long-arm statute without listing enumerated acts). 
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long-arm statute, due process concerns still apply.45 Accordingly, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the state’s long-arm statute allows 
Minnesota courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction only as far as the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows.46 Furthermore, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court applies federal case law to analyze the long-
arm statute because federal decisions govern the statute’s federal questions.47 
Thus, this mandate requires a history of federal case law’s analysis of specific 
personal jurisdiction and long-arm statutes before Minnesota’s analysis 
begins.48 
B. Evolution of the Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine 
The applicable federal law concerning specific personal jurisdiction 
begins with Pennoyer v. Neff.49 In Pennoyer, the claim involved a suit against 
a non-resident defendant who was not personally served with process.50 
Instead, the plaintiff used constructive service through publication, and the 
defendant did not appear in court to defend the lawsuit.51 Accordingly, the 
court issued a default judgment, and a sheriff seized and sold the 
                                                           
45 See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Even if the defendant’s activities 
satisfy the long-arm statute, it is still possible that exercising jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant nevertheless will fail because of a due process violation.”). 
46 Valaspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992). 
47 Id. at 411; see also Atkinson v. U.S. Operating Co., 129 Minn. 232, 233, 152 N.W. 410, 
410 (1915) (“we simply apply federal case law” when examining Minnesota’s long-arm 
statute). 
48 See id. 
49 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715 (1877). This case marked the advent of personal 
jurisdiction within the common law and remained the controlling authority regarding 
personal jurisdiction doctrine prior to International Shoe. Id. at 733–34. Pennoyer held, to 
establish personal jurisdiction, a defendant “must be brought within its jurisdiction by services 
of process within the State, or by [the defendant’s] . . . voluntary appearance.” Id. at 733. 
Beyond the caselaw, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are also central to the 
development of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as they “govern civil proceedings in 
United States district courts.” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, U.S. FED. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-
procedure [https://perma.cc/8Y3X-VPPJ]. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the 
Supreme Court to create the FRCP. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077. “[T]he rulemaking 
process was [then] delegated by the Court to committees of the Judicial Conference, the 
policy-making body of the U.S. Courts.” How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. FED. 
CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-
process-works [https://perma.cc/7YL2-LXQJ]. Presently, committees of the Judicial 
Conference engage in an ongoing analysis of the function and impact of the federal rules. Id. 
As a result of this ongoing analysis, a committee may decide to propose a change to the rules, 
which invokes several review steps before submission to the Supreme Court for 
consideration and approval of any recommended changes. Id. Today, the process for 
challenging personal jurisdiction is codified under the FRCP. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). 
50 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 716–17. 
51 Id. 
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defendant’s land to satisfy the judgement.52 The defendant appealed the 
decision.53 
Pennoyer determined that service of process solely provided 
through publication offended principles of due process.54 In its analysis, the 
Court reasoned that “[p]rocess from the tribunals of one State cannot run 
into another State, and summon a party there domiciled to respond to 
proceedings against him.”55 Like processes sent to defendants out of state, 
processes published in periodicals cannot establish personal jurisdiction 
over a non-resident defendant and do not create an obligation for the 
defendant to appear in court.56 Instead, service of process alongside 
publication, or the defendant’s voluntary appearance within the forum state, 
create personal jurisdiction under a due process analysis.57 
Present-day personal jurisdiction jurisprudence stems from the 
decision in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington.58 There, 
the defendant, International Shoe Company, was a Delaware company with 
an office in St. Louis, Missouri.59 At issue in the case was the company’s use 
of salespeople in Washington.60 International Shoe used salespeople in 
Washington by shipping products to them, having them display and sell 
those products, and then compensating them with a commission for the sale 
of those products.61 In addition, International Shoe reimbursed its 
Washington salespeople for renting offices and storefronts in the state.62 
Washington sued International Shoe for its failure to contribute to an 
unemployment fund as required by Washington statute.63 
The holding of International Shoe established the beginning of the 
minimum contacts test, which requires certain minimum contacts between 
the defendant and the forum state to maintain a suit.64 The notion behind 
the test contends that so long as the defendant-corporation has minimum 
contacts with the forum state, a court can properly exercise personal 
                                                           
52 Id. at 719. Pennoyer determined that service of process solely provided through publication 
(such as newspaper ads) offended principles of due process. 
53 Id. at 715. 
54 See id. at 714 (“A personal judgment is without any validity, if it be rendered by a State 
court in an action upon a money-demand against a non-resident of the State, who was served 
by publication of summons, but upon whom no personal service of process within the State 
was made, and who did not appear . . . .”).  
55 Id. at 715. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 68. 
59 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 313–14. 
62 Id. at 314. 
63 Id. at 311. 
64 See Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 69. 
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jurisdiction without upsetting the “traditional concepts of fair play and 
substantial justice.”65  
Furthermore, the Court held that International Shoe received legal 
benefits and protections from Washington, and could have relied upon 
Washington’s courts if it needed to enforce a right through legal action.66 
The Court began its minimum contacts analysis by recognizing that 
presence within a state for jurisdictional purposes had been established by 
continuous and systematic contact.67 However, the Court also conceded that 
a corporate agent’s presence within the state and isolated activity by those 
agents is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction over a corporation.68 
In these instances, litigation outside the corporation’s home state would be 
unreasonably burdensome and costly, thus breaking with due process.69 
Second, the Court indicated that when a corporation avails itself of the 
privileges and legal benefits within a state, service of process over this 
corporation complies with due process.70 Therefore, service of process to 
International Shoe was proper because it sought the protections of 
Washington’s laws. Furthermore, the operations of its salespeople created 
sufficient contacts with Washington to comply with due process notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.71 
In subsequent decisions, “the court essentially took the position that 
so long as the chosen forum was an arguably sensible place to litigate, given 
the connection between the forum and the parties . . . jurisdiction would be 
valid.”72 In McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, the Court 
considered whether the residence of one party to a business contract in a 
forum state created jurisdiction over the other non-resident party to that 
contract.73 Here, a California resident, the plaintiff, bought life insurance 
from Empire Mutual Insurance Company, an Arizona business.74 
International Life Insurance Co., the defendant, later acquired the contract 
from Empire Mutual Insurance.75 The California resident paid his 
                                                           
65 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. 
66 See id. (indicating International Shoe “received the benefits and protection of the laws of 
the state, including the right to resort to the courts for enforcement of its rights”). 
67 Id. at 317. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 319. 
71 Id. at 320. 
72 Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 72–73; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220 
(1957) (holding that exercising personal jurisdiction over an insurance company 
incorporated in Texas was appropriate because the life insurance company refused to pay 
out a policy to a deceased resident of California after it specifically targeted the forum state 
and solicited business from the resident there). 
73 McGee, 355 U.S. at 220. 
74 Id. at 221. 
75 Id. at 222. 
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premiums from his home in California to International Life Insurance’s 
offices in Texas by mail.76 When the contract’s payment came into effect, 
International Life Insurance refused to pay the California resident.77 
In its holding, the Court stated that if the forum state’s contacts arise 
from a contract with a substantial connection to that state, due process is 
validated.78 Therefore, exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
company incorporated in another state was appropriate because California 
“ha[d] a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its 
residents when their insurers refuse[d] to pay claims. These residents would 
be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the insurance 
company to a distant State to hold it legally accountable.”79 The Court found 
a substantial connection to the forum state through the premiums mailed 
from California, the contract’s enactment in California, and the resident’s 
death in California.80 Thus, these activities created the minimum contacts 
required with the forum state and did not offend due process.81 
However, the Court limited this expansion in Hanson v. Denckla.82 
In Hanson, the Florida court considered a situation similar to McGee in 
that the claim involved acquiring jurisdiction over a trust execution that 
originated in Delaware.83After executing a trust in Delaware, a woman then 
executed a will in Florida involving the trust before dying there.84 The 
Florida Supreme Court held that the court’s jurisdiction covered the 
trustees, who were the non- residents.85 However, a Delaware court claimed 
that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction over the non-residents.86 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware court’s decision.87 In 
their holding, the Justices stated that a court could not require defendants 
to defend a claim unless they have both minimal contacts with the forum 
state and the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the forum state 
                                                           
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 224. 
79 Id. at 223. 
80 Id. at 221–22. 
81 Id. at 222. 
82 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (stating that a defendant cannot be required 
to defend itself in a different state unless the defendant has minimal contacts with that state 
and the defendant purposefully availed itself to the state’s privileges by conducting activities 
in the forum state). 
83 Compare McGee, 355 U.S. at 221 (handling an insurance sale that transpired in California 
between a California resident and an Arizona company that later sold the account to a Texas 
Company), with Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238 (implicating a probate dispute over a trust that was 
executed in Delaware but subject to a will sworn out in Florida after the testator moved there). 
84 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 240. 
85 Id. at 238. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 256. 
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by accepting the benefits of the forum state’s legal protections.88 The Court 
determined the Florida court erred in its decision because “[t]he settlor’s 
execution in Florida of her power of appointment cannot remedy the 
absence of such an act in this case.”89 Furthermore, Florida did not acquire 
jurisdiction over the non-resident party solely by being the “center of gravity” 
for the claim and the most convenient location for litigation.90 
Subsequently, the Court further explained its definition of 
“minimum contacts” in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.91 The 
Court held that personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant requires 
contacts between the defendant and the forum state that are not 
happenstance.92 The plaintiffs, two automobile drivers who were New York 
residents, were hurt in a car accident in Oklahoma during a road trip.93 They 
then filed a claim in Oklahoma state court against World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corporation, a car distributor and retailer that was incorporated and had a 
principal place of business in New York.94 
The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen recognized that 
International Shoe “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that 
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable.”95 The predictability outlined in International Shoe allows a 
corporation that “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State . . . [to have] clear notice that it is subject to 
suit there, and [] act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation.”96  
However, the Court did not endorse the notion that the mere 
predictability of a vehicle traveling to another state should render a motor-
vehicle dealership or manufacturer subject to personal jurisdiction in a 
foreign-state to which that vehicle traveled.97 Rather, the decision in World-
Wide Volkswagen represented the evolution of personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence requiring contacts, ties, or relations with the forum state 
constituting more than mere collateral financial benefits.98 So, while it may 
                                                           
88 See id. at 253 (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”). 
89 Id. at 254. 
90 Id. 
91 See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
92 Id. at 287. 
93 Id. at 288. 
94 Id. at 289. 
95 Id. at 297. 
96 Id.; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
97 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–99 (“But there is no such or similar basis for 
Oklahoma jurisdiction . . . [t]here is no evidence of record that any automobiles distributed 
by World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside this tristate area.”). 
98 Id. at 299. 
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be foreseeable that a vehicle purchased from World-Wide Volkswagen 
might end up in Oklahoma, foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish 
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.99 
The Court has reinforced the idea that a defendant must have 
minimum contacts with the forum state in other cases. For specific 
jurisdiction, the Court established that a defendant’s general connections 
with a forum state is insufficient.100 Rather, the controversy must arise from, 
or relate to, a defendant’s contacts with a forum state and the controversy 
must produce a substantial connection between the defendant and forum 
state.101 Also, the Court has held that specific personal jurisdiction does not 
exist when the suit lacks a connection between the forum state and the main 
controversy, even if the defendant conducts business in the state 
unconnected to the controversy within the State.102 Likewise, the Court held 
that mere injury to a forum state does not establish personal jurisdiction,103 
nor does the mere presence of a chattel in the forum state establish personal 
jurisdiction over the chattel’s owner.104 To denote this connection, the Court 
applied a standard mandating that conduct gives rise to or relates to the 
claim.105 
The World-Wide Volkswagen holding reemerged in the plurality 
opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California.106 Asahi 
was a case involving arguably stronger contacts than World-Wide 
Volkswagen because the non-resident had actual knowledge, or should have 
had actual knowledge, that at least some of its component products were 
being directly sold to the forum state of California.107 Asahi had two holdings, 
a plurality opinion and a majority opinion.108 The plurality opinion did not 
believe actual knowledge of a product’s entrance into the stream of 
commerce in a specific state sufficed to create personal jurisdiction, but 
would require evidence that the non-resident defendant advertised in the 
                                                           
99 Id. at 295. 
100 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
101 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (stating 
that specific personal jurisdiction must arise from the defendant’s conduct with the forum); 
see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (mandating the existence of a substantial 
connection between the forum state and defendant’s suit-related conduct for personal 
jurisdiction). 
102 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (stating 
sales within a forum state does not grant personal jurisdiction over an unrelated controversy). 
103 Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. 
104 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). 
105 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 (2014); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414–16.        
106 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
107 Id.; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11 at 99–100; see generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 
U.S. at 297–99. 
108 Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 99–101. 
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forum state or designed the product for the forum state.109 The majority 
opinion in Asahi held that “even if minimum contacts existed in . . . [Asahi], 
it would be unreasonable to allow California to exercise jurisdiction.”110 
Asahi represents an additional evolution in personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence regarding non-resident defendants. Foreseeable minimum 
sufficient contacts must exist with the forum state, and the contacts must 
constitute purposeful direction toward the forum state in the form of specific 
advertising or product development targeting that specific state.111 
Additionally, courts still perform an analysis as to the fairness of defending 
a claim in the forum in question.112   
In modern long-arm statute cases, the Court has analyzed whether 
a product’s entrance into a forum’s stream of commerce satisfies the analysis 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. For 
example, in J. McIntyre Machine, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed whether New Jersey’s exercise of jurisdiction 
violated due process.113 There, the in-state resident injured his hand in a 
metal-shearing machine produced in England by J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd., a company incorporated and operated in England.114 At no time did 
petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an intent to 
invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.115 The evolution of personal 
jurisdiction under McIntyre reaffirms the requirement that contacts be 
specifically targeted to the forum state, thus availing the party of its 
jurisdiction.116 The Court found that the New Jersey Supreme Court violated 
J. McIntyre Machinery’s due process because the company, in using a 
United States distributor, did not expect its products to be purchased by 
residents of the forum state.117 However, if J. McIntyre Machinery had 
expected this outcome, then the exercise would have complied with due 
                                                           
109 Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 103–04; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 99–100. 
110 Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 108; see also Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 100. 
111 Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 100. 
112 Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 102. 
113 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); see generally Asahi Metal, 480 
U.S. at 102; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–99 (1980). 
114 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878. 
115 Id. at 887; Pfeffer, supra note 11, at 115–17. 
116 See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (“[T]ransmission of goods permits the exercise of 
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general 
rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the 
forum State.”); Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 335–36 (Minn. 2016) 
(concluding MoneyMutual targeted Minnesota through television advertisements and the use 
of internet Google AdWords advertisements). 
117 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886. 
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process because the products would have entered the forum’s stream of 
commerce at the company’s direction, constituting purposeful ailment.118  
The most recent case to take center stage in the evolving 
jurisprudence of specific personal jurisdiction is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. Superior Court, where the Court held that specific personal jurisdiction 
over claims brought by a non-resident plaintiff was improper.119 Under 
Bristol-Myers Squibb, there must also be an affiliation between the forum 
state and the specific underlying claim at issue to support personal 
jurisdiction.120 Bristol-Myers Squibb did not mention whether its holding 
would impact properly certified class action claims, but the majority stated  
the “decision does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from 
joining together in a consolidated action in the States that have general 
jurisdiction over [Bristol-Myers Squibb].”121 
With these cases in mind, the United States Supreme Court 
produced an analysis of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
through a factor-based test.122 If the factors weigh in the defendant’s favor, 
then the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction does not comply with the Due 
Process Clause.123 The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the same test 
when analyzing due process and long-arm statutes.124 
C. Minnesota’s Adherence to Federal Due Process Standards 
While Minnesota’s long-arm statute is of the laundry-list variety, 
due process analysis still applies to the statute once a claim meets the activity 
criteria.125 The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that Minnesota’s long-
arm statute extends Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction only “as far as the Due 
Process Clause of the federal constitution allows.”126 Furthermore, “when 
                                                           
118 See id. at 881–82 (“This Court has stated that a defendant’s placing goods into the stream 
of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
State’ may indicate purposeful ailment.”). 
119 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1733, 1776 (2017). 
120 Id. at 1776–77. 
121 Id. at 1783; see also Joan R. Camagong, Applying Bristol-Myers Squibb to Class Actions, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/products-
liability/practice/2019/applying-bristol-myers-squibb-to-class-actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HS8-6M6Y]. 
122 See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (“Analysis under the due process 
long-arm and constitutional long-arm is identical.”). 
123 Id. 
124 See Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Minn. 2019) (listing the five factors 
that a Minnesota court must find to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a company 
not in personam). 
125 See CROSS, ABRAMSON & DEASON, supra note 22, at 70 (stating even if the defendant’s 
activities satisfy the long-arm statute, it is still possible that exercising jurisdiction over the 
non-resident defendant will nevertheless fail because of a due process violation). 
126 Valaspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. 1992). 
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analyzing most personal jurisdiction questions, Minnesota courts may 
simply apply the federal case law.”127 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently interpreted the 
aforementioned United States Supreme Court holdings in Rilley v. 
MoneyMutual, LLC.128 First, the Minnesota Supreme Court established five 
factors for the defendant that include “(1) the quantity of contacts with the 
forum state; (2) the nature and quality of contacts; (3) the connection of the 
cause of action with these contacts; (4) the interest of the state providing a 
forum; and (5) the convenience of all the parties.”129 Courts use these factors 
to decide whether a defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum state 
and if its contacts sufficiently relate to the cause of action.130 Second, when 
considering sufficient minimum contacts, the Rilley holding mandates that 
a court consider all of the defendant’s alleged contacts together, and not 
individually, through the totality of the circumstances.131 Finally, in Juliech v. 
Yamazki Maka Optonics Corp, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that 
the first three factors determine whether “minimum contacts” exist.132 
III. THE BANDEMER DECISION 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
 In January 2015, Minnesota resident Adam Bandemer rode as a 
passenger in Eric Hanson’s 1994 Ford Crown Victoria on a Minnesota 
road.133 Hanson, the driver, rear-ended a snowplow, causing the car to enter 
a ditch.134 As a result of this crash, Bandemer allegedly suffered a severe 
brain injury due to the passenger-side airbag’s failure to deploy.135 Bandemer 
also alleged that a manufacturing defect caused the vehicle’s airbag’s 
failure.136 
Bandemer “filed a complaint in district court alleging products 
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims against Ford.”137 
Subsequently, Ford moved to dismiss the claim for lack of personal 
jurisdiction because the used car involved in the accident was neither 
                                                           
127 Id. at 411. 
128 Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 321 (Minn. 2016). 
129 Id. at 328 (quoting Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 570 
(Minn. 2004)). 
130 Id. at 332. 
131 Id. at 337. 
132 Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 568. 




137 Id. Bandemer also named Hanson and Hanson’s father as defendants in a negligence 
claim that lies outside the scope of this Paper. Id.  
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designed, manufactured, nor originally sold in Minnesota.138 However, Ford 
did not dispute the quantity of its contacts with Minnesota or the 
reasonableness of personal jurisdiction.139 
Ford moved for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction, 
but Minnesota courts believed Ford had sufficient contacts with Minnesota, 
through its business practices, including advertising, sales, and data 
collection.140 First, Ford sold more than two thousand 1994 Crown Victorias 
to Minnesotan dealerships and about two hundred thousand vehicles in 
total between 2013 and 2015.141 Second, various Ford advertising campaigns 
contacted Minnesotans through various mediums, including direct mail 
advertisements coupled with contacts relating to Ford’s national advertising 
campaigns.142 Ford’s marketing efforts also included a 2016 “Ford 
Experience Tour” in Minnesota, a 1966 Ford Mustang designed for the 
Minnesota Vikings, a “Ford Driving Skills for Life Free National Teen 
Driver Training Camp” held in Minnesota, and sponsorship of Minnesota 
athletic events.143 Third, Ford collected data from its Minnesotan dealerships 
to further both redesigns and repairs.144 Finally, Ford has employees, 
mechanics, service agents, franchises, and real property in Minnesota.145 
Initially, Ford’s registered agent for service of process received 
certified mail containing notice of the lawsuit, but certified mail is an 
improper form of service under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.146 
Ford alleged defective service in its answer, but subsequently moved for 
voluntary transfer of venue to Todd County, Minnesota, the county in which 
the Hansons resided.147 Plaintiff then properly served “the summons and 
complaint on Ford Motor Company by process server delivering a copy of 
the summons and complaint to its registered agent for service.”148 
The motion then proceeded through the district court, appellate 
court, and eventually to the Minnesota Supreme Court.149 The district court 
held that  personal jurisdiction was appropriate.150 However, Ford 
                                                           
138 Id. 
139 Id. 






146 Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 77-CV-16-1025, 2017 WL 10185684, at *1 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. May 25, 2017); see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(c). 
147 Bandemer, 2017 WL 10185684, at *1. 
148 Id. 
149 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748–49. 
150 Id. at 748. 
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appealed.151 Applying Rilley v. MoneyMutual,152 the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals determined the district court did not err in its denial of Ford’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.153 The court reasoned 
that Ford’s marketing efforts in Minnesota formed a substantial connection 
between Ford, Minnesota, and the litigation.154 Thus, Ford purposefully 
availed itself of Minnesota law, and Ford’s contacts were sufficiently related 
to the alleged brain damage suffered from the alleged defect in the 1994 
Crown Victoria’s airbags.155 Furthermore, the court rejected Ford’s 
argument that Supreme Court precedent now requires a more direct 
connection between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation than the 
standard for connection stated in Rilley.156 Thereafter, Ford appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.157 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, 
concluding “Ford’s contacts alone [were] sufficient to support specific 
personal jurisdiction.”158 First, the court stated the standard for Minnesota’s 
long-arm statute which “prevents personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
defendant if it would ‘violate fairness and substantial justice.’”159 Then, as it 
had in Valspar Corp. v. Lukken Color Corp.,160 the court stated that 
Minnesota’s long-arm statute grants Minnesota courts personal jurisdiction 
only within the limits of the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.161 Additionally, section 543.19 of the Minnesota Statutes states 
that exercising personal jurisdiction is improper if it “offends traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”162 Yet, a state attempting to exert 
personal jurisdiction “‘does not exceed its powers under the Due Process 
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its 
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be 
                                                           
151 Id. 
152 884 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2016). 
153 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 715.  
154 Id. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 749. 
158 Id. at 755. 
159 Id. at 749 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subdiv. 1(4)(ii) (2018)). 
160 495 N.W.2d 408, 410–11 (Minn. 1992). 
161 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749. 
162 Id. at 749 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see generally 
MINN. STAT. § 542.19, subdiv. 1(4)(ii) (2020). 
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purchased by consumers in the forum State’ and those products 
subsequently injure forum consumers.”163  
To determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Ford 
would comport with federal due process, the court analyzed five factors.164 
These factors included (1) the quantity of Ford’s contacts with Minnesota, 
(2) the nature and quality of Ford’s contacts, (3) the connection of Ford’s 
contacts with Bandemer’s the cause of action—his brain injury resulting from 
the Crown Victoria’s defect, (4) Minnesota’s interest in the litigation, and (5) 
the convenience for Ford and Bandemer.165 Through these factors the 
Minnesota Supreme Court sought to examine “reasonableness in light of 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”166 The court then 
divided the first three factors into one category for a minimum contacts 
analysis.167 It then used the last two factors to test for reasonableness, fair 
play, and substantial justice.168 
Through an analysis of the first two factors, the court determined 
that the court of appeals did not err when it held that the quality and quantity 
of contacts between Ford and Minnesota satisfied the requirements for 
personal jurisdiction.169 The court relied on Ford’s marketing and data 
collection in Minnesota, which demonstrated that Ford placed its vehicles 
within Minnesota’s stream of commerce with the intent that Minnesotans 
would purchase them.170 Furthermore, Ford collected data about sales at 
Minnesotan dealerships, sold more than two thousand 1994 Crown 
Victorias in Minnesota alongside two hundred thousand other vehicles, and 
conducted directed marketing in the state.171 Thus, the court found that the 
suit’s connection with Minnesota surpassed “the mere unilateral activity of 
those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant” because 
Ford targeted its sales at Minnesotans.172 Hence, Ford availed itself of 
Minnesota.173 
In an analysis of the connection between the cause of action and 
Ford’s contacts with Minnesota, the court determined the exercise of 
                                                           
163 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749, 759 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 
462, 473 (1985)). States cannot exercise personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause 
unless the defendant has minimum contacts with that state and the suit comports with justice 
and fair play. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
164 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749. 
165 See id. (listing the five factors that require examination to determine if an exercise of 




169 Id. at 751. 
170 Id. at 750–51. 
171 Id. at 751. 
172 Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). 
173 Id. 
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personal jurisdiction was proper.174 The court repeated its analysis from 
Rilley,175 which stated that defendants solicited Minnesotans to purchase 
goods through targeted ads.176 Therefore, like the ads in Riley, Ford’s 
marketing constituted a relevant contact with Minnesota for the minimum 
contacts analysis.177 
To support this analysis, the court maintained that replacing the 
“relating to”178 standard with Ford’s “giving rise to” standard would create an 
unwarranted shift in specific personal jurisdiction law.179 The court rejected 
Ford’s argument that Bristol-Myers Squibb mandates a “giving rise to” 
standard because (1) it interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s 
language as buttressing the “relating to” standard,180 and (2) the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Court determined there were no connections between foreign 
plaintiffs and the forum state.181 Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court determined that the United States Supreme Court consistently 
applied a “relating to” standard in International Shoe because it held 
Washington State’s tax enforcement was sufficiently connected to 
International Shoe’s presence in Washington to create personal 
jurisdiction.182 Furthermore, while the World-Wide Volkswagen Court 
found the foreseeability that a car might travel to Oklahoma failed to 
establish personal jurisdiction,183 the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
if Volkswagen had advertised, sold, and collected data in Oklahoma, as 
Ford had in Minnesota, then the United States Supreme Court would have 
found personal jurisdiction.184 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court retained 
the “relating to” standard, finding Minnesota had personal jurisdiction over 
Ford.185 
                                                           
174 Id. at 755. 
175 Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 336–37 (Minn. 2016). 
176 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 751 (discussing how MoneyMutual’s solicitation of 
Minnesotans to apply for unlawful loans allowed a suit to survive dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction). 
177 Id. 
178 Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 337. 
179 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752. 
180 Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017)). In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court held “[o]ur settled principles regarding specific 
jurisdiction control this case.” 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
181 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752 (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 178). 
182 Id. at 753 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). 
183 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). 
184 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 753 (declining to adopt Ford’s rule that if a “particular 
vehicle was not designed, manufactured, or sold in Oklahoma . . . then it would not have 
mattered if the defendant sold millions of cars in Oklahoma.”). 
185 Id. 
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Next, the court determined that the facts met due process 
requirements because Ford’s contacts related to Bandemer’s claim.186 
Rejecting Ford’s claim that no tortious conduct of design, manufacturing, 
warrantying, or warning about the 1994 Crown Victoria occurred in 
Minnesota, the court determining that Ford’s targeted advertising and sales 
meant this specific Crown Victoria did not randomly arrive in Minnesota.187 
Bandemer’s allegations that Ford failed to detect the defect related to 
Minnesota because Ford collected data from Minnesotans about their 
vehicle purchases and targeted Minnesotans with advertisements.188 
Furthermore, the car crash occurred in Minnesota, its owner registered the 
vehicle in Minnesota, and Bandemer’s injuries were treated in Minnesota.189 
Therefore, as in Rilley,190 the court found the totality of the Bandemer’s 
allegations supported personal jurisdiction.191 
Finally, the court determined that the facts supported the 
reasonableness of Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction and comported with 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.192 The court 
established that Minnesota had a strong interest in adjudication because the 
accident involved a Minnesota county vehicle on a Minnesota road.193 
Furthermore, the dispute involved a Minnesota resident and a business that 
regularly transacted in Minnesota.194 Also, Minnesota had an interest in 
governing its roads.195 Next, Minnesota offered a convenient forum, as it was 
the location for Bandemer’s accident and treatment.196 Finally, even “Ford 
concede[d] that these factors [were] established,” and, as the court 
explained, “Minnesota ha[d] a strong interest in adjudicating this dispute 
regarding an accident . . . between a Minnesota resident as plaintiff and both 
Ford—a corporation that does business regularly in Minnesota—and two 
Minnesota residents as defendants.”197 
However, two justices dissented because they deemed Ford’s 
connections to the forum state and the cause of action to be unrelated and 
violative of due process.198 The justices disagreed for several reasons.199 First, 
                                                           
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 754. 
189 Id. 
190 Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2016). 
191 Bandamer, 931 N.W.2d at 755. 






198 Id. at 756 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
199 See id. at 756–61. 
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they found that the Crown Victoria entered Minnesota by chance, as it was 
designed in Michigan, assembled in Canada, and sold by Ford in a 
Bismarck, North Dakota dealership in 1994.200 The car entered Minnesota 
in 2011 by way of its fourth owner, and the accident occurred during the 
car’s fifth ownership, which started in 2013.201 Second, the dissent noted that 
Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned.202 Third, they 
argued that Ford engaged in national advertising that merely included 
Minnesota, rather than advertising that directly targeted Minnesotans.203 
Furthermore, the dissent noted that no recent advertisements included a 
1994 Crown Victoria.204 Fifth, the dissent distinguished Rilley from the 
instant case by stating the loan company both solicited services from 
Minnesotans and violated Minnesota consumer protection laws in the ads, 
while Ford’s marketing did not mention a Crown Victoria or its airbags.205 
Sixth, the dissent argued that injury to a forum resident alone is not sufficient 
to form a connection with the forum, so personal jurisdiction did not apply 
to Ford purely because of Bandemer’s accident.206 Accordingly, the dissent 
found a lack of personal jurisdiction.207 
However, the majority quickly distinguished this argument from the 
facts and held that the present case involved facts sufficiently connecting the 
non-resident defendant to the alleged injury in the forum state.208 
Conversely, in Bristol-Myers Squibb, “[t]he Supreme Court held that 
California did not have personal jurisdiction over the company regarding 
claims by out-of-state . . . plaintiffs because no connection existed between 
those out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant’s contacts with 
California.”209 As a result, the court affirmed the court of appeals decision, 
determining personal jurisdiction was properly exercised.210 
                                                           
200 Id. at 757–58. 
201 Id. at 758. 
202 Id. 
203 See id. (listing national advertising and direct mail, “which may reach the Minnesota 
market,” alongside online data collections that any American could as untargeted strategies). 
204 Id. at 760. 
205 Id. (distinguishing Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 2016)). 
206 Id. at 762 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)). 
207 See id. (stating that the defendant’s contacts with the forum were what mattered, and that 
the majority did not establish that Ford’s contacts with Minnesota related to Bandemer’s 
allegations). 
208 Id. at 752 (majority opinion). 
209 Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–
82 (2017)). 
210 See id. at 755. 
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C. Quick Note on Ford’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari  
The United States Supreme Court granted Ford’s petition for a writ 
of certiorari, and oral arguments were held on October 7, 2020.211 Ford, in 
its brief, argued for the adoption of a causal relationship standard for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.212 In contrast, Bandemer posited that 
adopting Ford’s proposition would transition personal jurisdictional analysis 
into something more akin to tort law’s proximate cause standard.213The 
following analysis sections contain two opposing arguments written by the 
separate authors. The first analysis argues the Minnesota Supreme Court 
correctly decided Bandemer, while the second analysis argues the 
Bandemer decision was made in error.   
IV. THE ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION214 
A. The Bandemer Decision: A Five-Factor Analysis  
The Bandemer decision correctly upheld the minimum contacts 
and due process analysis necessary for Minnesota to exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction.215 The minimum contacts analysis includes: “(1) the 
quantity of contacts with the forum state; (2) the nature and quality of those 
contacts; (3) the connection of the cause of action with these contacts; (4) 
the interest of the state providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the 
parties.”216 The factors themselves are not individually determinative, rather 
the defendant’s contacts are considered in aggregate “by looking at the 
totality of the circumstances.”217 Furthermore, “the first three factors 
determine whether Ford has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with Minnesota, 
                                                           
211 Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/ford-motor-company-v-bandemer/ [https://perma.cc/B9EX-J2KE]; see also Ford 
Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, OYEZ (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-368 [https://perma.cc/2LDL-YY98]; Oral Argument: 
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, SCOTUS (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www. supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2020/19-368 
[https://perma.cc/XMN5-YLKA]. 
212 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (Nos. 19-368 & 
19-369), 2020 WL 1154744, at *15. 
213 Brief for Respondents at 10–12, Ford Motor Company v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 140 S. Ct. 917 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1531238, at *10–12; see 
also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212. 
214 This section of the analysis is authored exclusively by John-Paul Dees.  
215 See supra Section III.B (discussing the five factors Minnesota courts use to determine if 
specific personal jurisdiction is present). 
216 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749. 
217 Id. at 750 (citing Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 337 (Minn. 2016)). 
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and the last two factors determine whether jurisdiction is otherwise 
‘reasonable’ under concepts of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’”218 
1. Quality, Nature, and Quantity of Contacts 
In Bandemer, Ford did not dispute the first and second factors of 
the minimum contacts test as relating to the “quality or quantity of [Ford’s] 
contacts with Minnesota.”219 Ford’s use of regional advertising and marketing 
activities in Minnesota established “contacts that were not ‘random, 
fortuitous, or attenuated’” resulting in Ford’s purposeful availment of 
Minnesota law.220  
Although Ford does not dispute the nature or quality of its contacts 
with Minnesota,221 it is important to consider the significance advertisements 
and the age of internet commerce play in a minimum contacts analysis.222 In 
Asahi’s plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that “placing a product 
into the stream of commerce was not enough unless coupled with some 
other act.”223 O’Connor suggested that an example of an additional act could 
include “designing the product for the market . . . , advertising in the forum 
state, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers . . . , 
or marketing the product through a distributor . . . in the forum state.”224 
The significance of advertisements in establishing a connection to a 
forum state for specific personal jurisdiction is underutilized by legal teams. 
In Rilley v. MoneyMutual, the Minnesota Supreme Court, held that the 
purchase of Internet advertisements through the Google AdWords 
platform by MoneyMutual was a means to establish a significant connection 
                                                           
218 Id. at 749 (quoting Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp., 682 N.W.2d 565, 570 
(Minn. 2004)). 
219 Id. at 750–52 (stating that Ford’s contacts with Minnesota were sufficient for specific 
personal jurisdiction because “Ford’s data collection, marketing, and advertising in 
Minnesota demonstrate that it delivered its product into the stream of commerce with the 
intention that Minnesotans purchase such vehicles.”). 
220 Id. at 750 (quoting Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2018) (citation omitted)). 
221 See id. at 748. 
222 See generally Scott M. Hagel, Civil Procedure – The Stream of Commerce Theory in 
Minnesota: Does the Shoe Fit?, 24 WM. MICHELL L. REV. 231 (1998) (discussing stream of 
commerce theory decisions and their influence on decisions involving personal jurisdiction 
in Minnesota); Brian X. Chen, I Downloaded the Information That Facebook Has on Me. 
Yikes., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/personaltech/i-downloaded-the-
information-that-facebook-has-on-me-yikes.html [https://perma.cc/2XUK-V5YA]. 
223 See Hagel, supra note 222, at 237–38 (1998) (discussing Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). 
224 See id. at 238. 
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with Minnesota.225 If anything, the judiciary underestimates the significance 
of corporations utilizing data-mined information from private individuals to 
tailor advertisements specifically to citizens of various states in an attempt to 
encourage individuals to purchase goods.226 As a result of modern 
technology, corporations can utilize geo-fencing advertisements, a practice 
that forwards or triggers an advertisement to an individual on a smartphone 
alerting him or her of a particular offer, or company, based on radio 
frequency identification, Wi-Fi, GPS location, or cellular data.227 Courts 
should maintain a strong presumption favoring the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over non-resident corporations that advertise online because 
these corporations use this consumer data to guide business decisions 
relating to that forum.228  
 As a general matter, Ford offers a rewards program called 
“FordPass,” which enables Ford to collect an individual’s private 
                                                           
225 Rilley v. MoneyMutual, 884 N.W.2d 321, 336–39 (Minn. 2016). Google Ads is a platform 
that enables businesses to advertise business goods or services by paying for promotion in 
the form of search result appearances that coincide with certain predetermined search 




226 See Chen, supra note 222; Jake Frankenfield, Data Analytics, INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2020) 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/data-analytics.asp [https://perma.cc/EDW6-HSYV] 
(defining data analytics as “the science of analyzing raw data to make conclusions about that 
information. Many of the techniques and processes of data analytics have been automated 
into mechanical processes and algorithms that work over raw data for human 
consumption.”); Alexandra Twin, Data Mining, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ terms/d/datamining.asp [https://perma.cc/AKW5-K7AL] 
(describing the use of free customer loyalty cards that enable stores to easily track an 
individual’s spending habits to specifically tailor coupons to the individual encouraging 
additional consumption); Andrew Olton, Data Science Case Study: Optimizing Product 
Placement in Retail (Part 1), TOWARDS DATA SCIENCE (May 28, 2018), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/data-science-case-study-optimizing-product-placement-in-
retail-part-1-2e8b27e16e8d [https://perma.cc/G8AJ-SCGE] (describing the practical uses of 
big data and data analytics information can provide to retail businesses); see also Terry 
Turner, Data Mining, CONSUMER NOTICE (July 17, 2020), https://www.consumer 
notice.org/data-protection/mining/ [https://perma.cc/PYP8-VE35] (defining  “data-mining,” 
as the collection of an individual’s personal information for the purpose of the selling the 
information to companies to aid marketing efforts).  
227 Amber Kemmis, What is Geofencing? Everything You Need to Know About Location-
Based Marketing, BUS. 2 COMMUNITY (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.business2community.com/ marketing/what-is-geofencing-everything-you-need-
to-know-about-location-based-marketing-02274287 [https://perma.cc/3GW6-YEVV]; see 
also Charles Mazzini, The Five Ws (And One H) of Geofence Marketing, FORBES (Dec. 13, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagency council/2019/12/13/the-five-ws-and-one-
h-of-geofence-marketing/#2e78a3e649aa [https://perma.cc/N5AL-MFSX]. 
228 See generally supra note 226 (describing ways in which personal information gathered 
through data mining may guide business decisions). 
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information relating to the precise location where information is collected 
from a mobile device and/or a vehicle with location-based functions.229 
Additionally, Ford collects information relating to a vehicle’s current 
“location, travel direction, and speed” including deriving approximate 
locations through access points such as “cell towers, . . . IP address[es], 
whether location services are on or turned off, through the permission 
system used by . . . [an individual’s] mobile operating system.”230 
Furthermore, Ford uses the personal information collected under the guise 
of providing greater functionality and service because it enables Ford to 
personalize a consumer’s “experience, troubleshoot problems, [and] 
develop new and improved products, services, and marketing strategies and 
research.”231  
2. The Connection Between the Cause of Action and the Contacts 
Regarding the third factor, Ford maintains, in cases like Bandemer, 
that specific personal jurisdiction should be altered to make it more 
predictable.232 However, due to the pervasive and near-constant nature of 
data mining conducted across the country, a tenable argument for general 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporate defendants exists, 
regardless of whether the injured party’s personal data was used. 233 These 
data mining operations are pervasive to the point that they constitute 
continuous business operations in whichever state they occur.234 This 
argument ultimately relies on an exchange: if Ford Corporation wants to 
utilize the personal information of private individuals to assist the purported 
improvement of products and aid the creation of tailored marketing 
campaigns to potential customers, then Ford should reasonably expect to 
                                                           
229 FordPass Terms and Privacy Policy, FORD (Feb. 2020), https://owner.ford.com/fordpass/ 
fordpass-terms-and-conditions.html#two [https://perma.cc/VRD5-UZW5]; see also infra 
Section VII.A–C (outlining how Ford utilizes an individual’s personal information to further 
its own business operations and services). 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See generally Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019). 
233 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (“[A] court may assert jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation ‘to hear any and all claims against [it]’ only when the corporation's 
affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render 
[it] essentially at home in the forum State.’”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); FORD, supra note 229 (describing FordPass); supra 
note 226 (describing data mining practices more generally); infra Section VII.A–C (outlining 
how Ford utilizes an individual’s personal information to further its own business 
operations). 
234 FORD, supra note 229; infra Section VII.A–C (outlining how Ford utilizes an individual’s 
personal information to further its own business operations and services); see also supra 
notes 226–27. 
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avail itself of the forum states where Ford collects personal information from 
private citizens.235 
However, it is unlikely the United States Supreme Court will 
completely abandon the specific personal jurisdiction framework developed 
under the progeny of International Shoe. 236  In Bristol-Myers Squibb, Justice 
Alito, writing for the majority, stated that the Supreme Court’s “settled 
principles regarding specific jurisdiction control . . . [the] case” and “for a 
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must aris[e] out of or 
relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”237 
Maintaining this frame of reference and turning our attention to the 
third factor of the minimum contact test, Ford contended that specific 
personal jurisdiction would not be proper because the third factor should 
supposedly require a “‘giving rise to’ standard in place of the ‘arising out of 
or related to standard’” or a causal standard.238 However, Ford’s argument 
fails to account for Justice Alito’s language in Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
indicating Supreme Court jurisprudence controlled the Court’s decision, 
which recognized that personal jurisdiction may exist whether the requisite 
ties “arises out of” or “relate[s] to” a non-resident corporate defendant’s 
conduct.239 Relying on guiding principles outlining the proper exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in MoneyMutual, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
ultimately found Ford’s arguments unpersuasive and held that Ford’s 
advertisements constituted a sufficient “contact with the Minnesota forum 
for the purpose of minimum contacts analysis.”240 
3. Interest of the State Providing a Forum 
The fourth factor was established because a “dispute regarding an 
accident involving a Minnesota county vehicle that occurred on a Minnesota 
road, between a Minnesota resident as plaintiff and Ford” involved 
Minnesota’s “vital interest in protecting the safety of its residents, [and] 
regulating the safety of its roadways.”241 Ford argued that requiring a causal 
connection to establish specific personal jurisdiction would be most 
consistent with the principles of federalism.242 Additionally, Ford stated that 
“a non-causal test would allow a forum State to use a defendant’s 
                                                           
235 See generally FORD, supra note 229; see also infra Sections VII.A–C. 
236 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–81 (2017) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
237 Id.  
238 Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019); see generally Bristol-
Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782; see also supra Section III.B. 
239 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81; see also infra PartV. 
240 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752. 
241 Id. at 755. 
242 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 23. 
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unconnected in-state activities as a hook to regulate the defendant’s out-of-
state activities that actually form the basis of the plaintiff’s claims.”243 The 
arguments put forward in Ford’s brief woefully understate how a causal 
requirement for specific jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate 
defendant would do more to undermine federalism than it would conform 
with due process and any purported protections of federalism.244 
Additionally:  
Due process does not require that specific jurisdiction rest 
on a strict causal link between the defendant’s forum-state 
contacts and the plaintiffs claims, and inventing such a 
requirement provides no new benefits, whether in terms of 
fairness or federalism. It would, however, generate 
needless inefficiencies, jeopardize states’ well-accepted 
regulatory interests, and possibly result in claims that 
cannot be brought in any U.S. state.245 
Adopting a causal requirement for establishing specific personal jurisdiction 
would exacerbate the financial resource disparities between individual 
private plaintiffs and defendant corporations because litigation involving 
these parties will almost always involve a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction as a matter of course.246 
4. The Convenience of the Parties  
Lastly, the fifth factor pertaining to the convenience of the parties is 
appropriate for the Minnesota forum because it was “the site of the accident 
and treatment of injury” and the United States Supreme Court “has long 
recognized the States’ ‘Manifest Interest’ in providing judicial forums for 
their injured citizens, preventing them from having to follow defendants to 
                                                           
243 Id. at 25. 
244 Brief for Minnesota, Texas, thirty-seven other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4–6, Ford Motor Co. v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 
(2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1875615, at *4–6 [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief 
for Minnesota et al.]. 
245 Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 1. 
246 YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 20, at 477 (recognizing that judicial proceedings do not 
work as effectively or efficiently for poor litigants and with coin flip claims many litigants 
could face a David battling Goliath situation); cf. Brief of Respondents at 10–12, Ford Motor 
Company v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020) (Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 1531238, 
at *10–12 (indicating that if the causal standard were adopted and a widget manufactured by 
a non-resident defendant corporation caused an injury, the onus would fall upon the injured 
party to spend time and resources to identify the state of first-sale); Brief for Civil Procedure 
Professors, supra note 17, at 2 (describing the detrimental impact of a disruptive and 
inefficient causal test, which may break single disputes up across multiple state courts). 
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distant locals.”247 Additionally, in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, and 
the rapid adoption of technology within various adjudicatory proceedings 
for the observation of social distancing practices, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that remote proceedings are not only feasible, but desirable in 
many circumstances. 248 Non-resident defendant corporations should no 
longer be able to escape liability by arguing that defending a case in a foreign 
state is “inconvenient.”249 After all, at the very least, these defendants will be 
able to make remote appearances in their own defense, regardless of the 
venue.250 
B. Flaws in Ford’s Argument 
Ford argues the “giving rise to” standard articulated in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb narrows the scope of the minimum contacts analysis and 
subsequently requires a jurisdictionally relevant contact that gives rise to the 
plaintiff’s claim of harm.251 Ford attempts to egregiously narrow the 
minimum contact analysis by requiring a more pinpointed jurisdictionally 
relevant claim of injury to allow for the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction.252 This requirement is misguided, to say the least, because the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine was originally crafted as a mechanism and 
means to establish jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant and 
bring the defendant into the forum where the injured plaintiff resides.253 
Ford argues that the result in Bristol-Myers Squibb—in which the 
non-resident plaintiffs were denied specific personal jurisdiction—supports 
its position that Minnesota courts exercising personal jurisdiction in the 
Bandemer case would be inappropriate.254 However, the Bristol-Myers 
Squibb decision included language specifically indicating that non-resident 
                                                           
247 Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 755 (Minn. 2019); see Amici Curiae Brief for 
Minnesota et al., supra note 244, at 5 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957)).  
248 Joanna Goodman, Technology: LegalTech: Whose Team Are You On?, L. SOC’Y 
GAZETTE (May 18, 2020), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/analysis/whose-team-are-you-
on/5104284.article [https://perma.cc/8BLP-SDDP]; see also Lev Breydo, Can Covid-19 
Help Catalyze LegalTech Adoption?, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/lega
l_analytics/2020/202005/fa_2/ [https://perma.cc/GZA5-4682]. 
249 Goodman, supra note 248; Breydo, supra note 248. 
250 Goodman, supra note 248; Breydo, supra note 248. 
251 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–55; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 32–
33. 
252 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–53; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 32–
33. 
253 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945); see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220 (1957). 
254 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 752–53 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017)). 
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plaintiffs who were removed from the proceeding in California still had the 
ability to join “together in a consolidated action in the States that have 
general jurisdiction over . . . Bristol-Myers Squibb. Alternatively, the 
non-resident plaintiffs could probably sue together in their respective home 
States.”255 Furthermore, the Bristol-Myers Squibb decision did not extend 
jurisdiction to the plaintiffs who were “not forum-state residents and were 
not injured” in California.256 Conversely, in Bandemer, the plaintiff is a 
forum-state resident, and the exercise of personal jurisdiction would 
comport with previous Supreme Court personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.257 The Bristol-Myers Squibb decision supports exercising 
personal jurisdiction in the Bandemer case because Bristol-Myers Squibb 
indicates that when a consumer good, such as a prescription drug or mass-
manufactured vehicle, enters the stream of commerce,258 individuals can 
bring a suit in the state in which they are injured.259 Here, this logic supports 
Bandemer’s right to bring suit against Ford in Minnesota, the state in which 
he was injured.260  
In addition, regarding Bristol-Meyer Squibb, it is more accurate to 
say the Court felt the case would have been better suited to establish 
personal jurisdiction over non-resident plaintiffs had it been properly 
certified as a class action.261 The majority in Bristol-Myers Squibb 
determined that preventing non-resident plaintiffs from joining the case in 
California would not prevent the omitted plaintiffs “from joining together in 
a consolidated action in the States that have general jurisdiction over Bristol-
Myers Squibb.”262 This statement does not support Ford’s attempts to 
                                                           
255 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177. 
256 Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 17, at 4. 
257 Id. at 4–5. 
258 Stream-of-Commerce Theory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The 
principle that a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant 
places a product in the general marketplace and the product causes injury or damage in the 
forum state, as long as the defendant also takes other acts to establish some connection with 
the forum state, as by advertising there or by hiring someone to serve as a sales agent there.”). 
259 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177; Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 
17, at 2. 
260 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1177; Brief for Civil Procedure Professors, supra note 
17, at 2; see also Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019). 
261 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1782–84; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (describing the 
process to obtain proper certification for a class action); Class Action, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A lawsuit in which the court authorizes a single person or a 
small group of people to represent the interests of a larger group; specif[ically], a lawsuit in 
which the convenience either of the public or of the interested parties requires that the case 
be settled through litigation by or against only a part of the group of similarly situated persons 
and in which a person whose interests are or may be affected does not have an opportunity 
to protect his or her interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected 
representative, or through a person specially appointed to act as a trustee or guardian.”). 
262 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1783. 
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construe the decision in a manner that limits its liability for injuries that 
Ford-manufactured products may cause.263 
Furthermore, in the petition for certiorari, Ford posits that a 
plaintiff’s injury in a forum state is only sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s 
contacts with the state and not the contacts of the defendant.264 Ford attempts 
to support this argument by stating, “the plaintiff would have experienced 
this same injury wherever else he might have traveled, and [the plaintiff] . . 
. just happened to travel to” the forum state.265 However, even if 
Bristol-Myers Squibb did narrow the application of personal jurisdiction to 
require “but for” causation, the Minnesota court’s application of personal 
jurisdiction in Bandemer would still be correct.266 In the context of 
Bandemer, “but for” Defendant Hanson’s purchase of an allegedly 
negligently manufactured 1994 Ford Crown Victoria, there is no substantial 
certainty that Plaintiff Bandemer would have experienced the same or 
similar injuries.267 Ford might argue that incorporating the facts from  
Bandemer creates only a hypothetical and, therefore, overly attenuated 
connection, but this merely speaks to the fragility of Ford’s next argument 
in support of a causal standard.268 
Ford purports that a causal standard for establishing personal 
jurisdiction should be adopted because “[a] causal test for specific personal 
jurisdiction . . . furthers fairness. It ensures that a defendant will have fair 
warning that a particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of a foreign 
sovereign.”269 However, this argument is not persuasive because Ford is 
simply attempting to narrow its own accountability when facing individuals 
injured by products that Ford placed in the stream of commerce.270 Ford 
affirmatively availed itself to jurisdiction in Minnesota by continuously 
engaging in activities such as advertising and manufacturing its vehicles for 
the purpose of sale in the state.271 As a result of the continuous contacts Ford 
exhibited with Minnesota, Ford should reasonably foresee and anticipate a 
                                                           
263 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 1 (arguing that Ford should expect specific 
personal jurisdiction to be exercised in the forum of the first sale of a particular widget). 
264 See id. at 32. 
265 See id. at 33. 
266 See id. 
267 See id.; Levi M. Klinger-Christiansen, The Nexus Requirement After Bristol-Myers: Does 
“Arise out of or Relate to” Require Causation?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 
(2020) (noting that Bristol-Myers “narrowed the understanding of . . . the nexus requirement” 
to “require at-least but-for causation between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum 
contacts in most situations”). 
268 Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 752–53 (Minn. 2019); see also Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 212, at 23–26. 
269 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 26–27 (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
270 See supra Part IV. 
271 See supra Part IV. 
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court challenge that arises, or relates to, any alleged injuries involving a 
vehicle the company manufactured.272  
This position is only strengthened when the injury relates to a 
defective airbag, a known issue in vehicles for the past decade.273 It would 
seem Ford is attempting to enjoy the benefits of a free market while 
simultaneously seeking to shield itself from any liability by using recent 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence that treats the Due Process Clause as a 
proxy for jurisdictional analysis. Given the company’s reliance on national 
and global streams of commerce, this jurisdictional analysis would be better 
served by applying principles applicable to the interstate and international 
commerce clauses, not the restrictive, individualistic notions of due 
process.274  
Additionally, Ford stated in oral arguments that it would be unfair 
to subject the company to Minnesota’s courts and juries.275 However, the 
real travesty would be freeing manufacturers from liability where their 
vehicles are sold by an owner in one state, purchased by a driver in another, 
and subsequently the vehicle injures a private party due to a product defect 
but the injured individual is unable to litigate in the state where the injury 
occurred because Ford believed it was unfair in Bandemer.276 If the private 
sale of an automobile is allowed to shield automakers from liability, car 
manufacturers may be incentivized to build shoddier vehicles knowing they 
will not face repercussions in the event a vehicle breaks down after several 
years have passed and the car has changed hands since the initial purchase.277 
                                                           
272 See supra Part IV. 
273 See supra Part IV. 
274 See McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 873 (2011); University of South 
Carolina School of Law, McIntyre: Specific Jurisdiction and Stream of Commerce, 
YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKS49u59xrI 
[https://perma.cc/9U3J-GELG] (discussion at 30:20). 
275 Oral Argument at 11:05, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. _ 
(2021) (No.19-368 & No. 19-369), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-368 
[https://perma.cc/VQE3-LQJP]. During a colloquy between Justice Breyer and Attorney 
Sean Marotta regarding what would be unfair about litigating in both Minnesota and 
Montana, attorney Sean Marotta stated “I think what’s unfair about it is that Ford has to be 
subject to the rulings of Montana and Minnesota judges, be subject to the verdicts of Montana 
and Minnesota juries, be subject to the Montana and Minnesota Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure, and even if you don’t think that’s a significant burden on Ford because Ford’s a 
big company, the rule you’ll announce in this case applies to much smaller manufacturers.” 
Id. 
276 Id. But cf. Brief for Respondents, supra note 213, at 34 (indicating that depriving an injured 
resident access to the courts in the state in which they reside would be unfair). 
277 Trent Gillies, Car Owners are Holding Their Vehicles for Longer, Which is Both Good 
and Bad, CNBC (May 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/28/car-owners-are-holding-
their-vehicles-for-longer-which-is-both-good-and-bad.html [https://perma.cc/B2F3-JWEL] 
(discussing how individuals are owning their vehicles for longer periods of time); see also 
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Historically, motor-vehicle companies have opposed government 
regulations.278 As a result, trusting the automobile industry to independently 
improve the safety of its products, while narrowing the specific personal 
jurisdiction doctrine, is inappropriate.279 This is particularly true given the 
endless parade of reports chronicling defective airbag inflators in new 
vehicles.280  
Lastly, tort law further frustrates Ford’s argument in favor of 
adopting a causal standard for determining personal jurisdiction. Tort law, 
which previously embraced the influence of causal (proximate cause) 
thinking in the First and Second Restatements, has diverged and repudiated 
the influence of causal thinking in the Third Restatement of Torts.281 Here, 
Ford argues that a causal standard would ensure predictability and 
federalism.282 However, it is difficult to credit these arguments when the field 
of law that widely attempted to use causal standards is now retreating from 
the theories’ use.283 
C. Possible Reasons Why Ford Advocates for Changes to Personal 
Jurisdiction  
1. Historic Levels of Pro-Business Supreme Court Justices  
The Roberts Court is “highly pro-business—the conservatives 
extremely so and the liberals only moderately liberal.”284  
                                                           
infra text accompanying note 298 (defining and discussing planned obsolescence in the 
automobile industry). 
278 See generally Russel Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/8S5Y-46TW] 
(describing how Volkswagen built a bypass mechanism that could tell when it was being tested 
and could temporarily modify emissions to pass the admissions test rather than 
manufacturing a vehicle that met government emission requirements). 




281 For a more detailed analysis, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. g (AM. L. 
INST. 2012). 
282 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 42. 
283 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 2012). 
284 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013) (analyzing and comparing present day 
Supreme Court data sets involving businesses as either the petitioner or respondent with 
previous iterations of the Court); see also Michelle Conlin, Dan Levine & Lisa Girion, 
Special Report: Why Big Business Can Count on Courts to Keep its Deadly Secrets, 
REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courts-secrecy-lobbyist-
specialre/special-report-why-big-business-can-count-on-courts-to-keep-its-deadly-secrets-
idUSKBN1YN1GF [https://perma.cc/4623-BCR4]; Adam Winkler, Why Big Business 
Keeps Winning at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), 
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Business petitioners accounted for 34.7% of the Business 
Litigant Dataset from 1946 to 1968 (the Vinson and 
Warren Courts), 54.0% from 1969 to 2004 (the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts), and 64.9% since 2005 (the Roberts 
Court). The increases in the separate win rates for business 
petitioners and business respondents . . . have been more 
modest. For business petitioners, the win rate is 45.0% in 
the Vinson and Warren Courts, 54.4% in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, and 64.0% in the Roberts Court. For 
business respondents, the win rates in those three Courts 
are 23.3%, 30.5%, and 37.0%, respectively.285 
Furthermore, Justices Alito, Roberts, Thomas, Kennedy, and Scalia are 
among the ten most business-friendly Justices to serve on the Court since 
1946.286 Given the unprecedented favorable decisions the Robert’s Court 
has issued for corporations, corporate defendants often select specific cases 
to appeal up to the Court in order to set favorable precedents moving 
forward.287 
2. Using, or Advocating for Change to, Existing Judicial Procedures 
to Limit Corporate Liability  
Prior to several asbestos settlements, which constituted the largest 
mass tort action in the United States in terms of number of claims, the 
judicial system largely permitted individuals unfettered access to evidence 
logs from court proceedings.288 Information gathered by attorney Ronald 
Motley, in an openly-available evidence log, helped establish the 
cornerstone for many arguments and claims against corporations for 
knowingly exposing employees to asbestos.289 In the aftermath, corporations 
                                                           
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/ 2017/06/26/why-big-business-
keeps-winning-at-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/GM4G-QWZX] (detailing the pro-
business mindset of the Supreme Court following the appointment of Justice Gorsuch and 
identifying the pro-business federation known as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that filed 
amicus briefs in fifteen cases—with “11 wins and only three losses (one case remains to be 
decided)”); About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., 
https://www.uschamber.com/about/about-the-us-chamber-of-commerce 
[https://perma.cc/WG5L-BPRE].    
285 Epstein et al., supra note 284, at 1453–54.  
286 Id. at 1449. 
287 See generally OYEZ, supra note 211 (arguing that the court should adopt a causation rule 
of personal jurisdiction or state of first sale, to ensure that Ford is only liable to individuals 
that purchase Ford vehicles from certified dealerships); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, 
at 15. 
288 Conlin et al., supra note 284 (describing the history of corporations advocating to keep 
various kinds of information under seal during and after litigation). 
289 Id. 
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and their “lawyers and lobbyists . . . [moved] to hide evidence that they 
sacrificed their customers’ [and employees’] health and safety in the name 
of corporate efficiencies” by seeking to keep a myriad of documents and 
interviews under seal.290  
Corporate attorneys routinely convince judges to seal court filings, 
ensuring that information and evidence giving rise, or relating, to the claim 
at hand remains hidden once the product liability case is settled.291 The effect 
of courts sealing documents contributes to the compounding negative health 
and safety repercussions for private citizens who unknowingly interacted 
with dangerous products.292 Various consumer product lines demonstrate 
the cascading negative impact of sealed evidence on the health and safety of 
private citizens. The products themselves range across industries, including 
prescription drugs, firearms, and motor vehicles.293 
Ford, as a large-cap company,294 has nearly infinite financial 
resources and can bring procedural challenges, such as personal jurisdiction 
in Bandemer, that border on frivolous. This is particularly problematic in 
disputes that pit companies against private parties, where companies often 
                                                           
290 Id. (quoting U.S. Representative Hank Johnson from Georgia). 
291 Id. (detailing how keeping court information under seal led to nearly 250,000 separate 
death and injury lawsuits); see also Facts + Statistics: Product Liability, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-product-liability [https://perma.cc/ES6J-K2GC] 
(reiterating that most lawsuits are settled out of court). 
292 Conlin et al., supra note 284. 
293 See id.; Jan Hoffman, Payout From a National Opioids Settlement Won’t Be as Big as 
Hoped, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/health/national-
opioid-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/52H2-MVMS] (describing the state of ongoing 
litigation involving thousands of cities “suing the pharmaceutical industry”); Remington: 
Product Safety Warning and Recall Notice, REMINGTON ARMS CO., 
https://xmprecall.remington.com/ [https://perma.cc/G2GZ-XSL9] (describing how the 
trigger on one model of Remington firearm may experience unintended discharge even when 
the safety is on and the trigger has not been pulled); Justice for Deadly Rollover Roof Crush 
Accidents: Injury/Paralysis, DEFECTS LAWYER, https://defectslawyer.com/rollover-roof-
crush-accident/ [https://perma.cc/X7VR-A7YP] (describing the heighted potential for injury 
in an SUV as a result of a rollover accident); see also Rollover: The Hidden History of the 
SUV, PBS FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/rollover/unsafe/cron.html [https://perma.cc/E9BC-GEFR] 
(describing the history of the SUV and initial attempts at greater regulation of the vehicles 
design).  
294 James Chen, Market Capitalization, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 3. 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp [https://perma.cc/Q322-
PLMF] (“Large-cap” companies have “a market capitalization of $10 billion or more [and] . 
. . market capitalization refers to the total dollar market value of a company’s outstanding 
shares of stock.”); see also Ford Motor Company, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/F/ [https://perma.cc/RV76-JBK9] (showing that Ford has a 
market cap of 30.315 billion dollars). 
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use aggressive motion practice to drain opponents of funds in order to force 
concessions and negotiate settlements.295  
Here, the parties in Bandemer have debated the issue of personal 
jurisdiction for nearly three years, which, on its face, contravenes the 
overriding goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.296 Here, Ford 
knows that a majority of product liability claims settle prior to trial, so if it is 
able to petition for its desired changes to the doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction, the company will be able to avoid liability in at least some 
instances by convincing a judge that any future lawsuit lacks specific personal 
jurisdiction. At a minimum, this creates another procedural hurdle for 
prospective plaintiffs because plaintiffs will incur greater costs in justifying a 
challenge to personal jurisdiction, while a corporate defendant may see 
significant cost savings if a claim is dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.297 
Furthermore, narrowing specific personal jurisdiction as Ford 
proposes is asinine because Ford deliberately chooses to cannibalize its 
market each year by manufacturing new makes and models of its vehicles 
with mostly aesthetic changes. This is a business practice commonly 
referred to as perceived obsolescence.298 As a result, private sales often occur 
while cars are quite new, which renders the exclusion of liability after the 
private sale of a motor vehicle nonsensical.299 Consider an example 
analogous to the hypothetical posed by Justice Clarence Thomas during oral 
arguments: An individual purchases a new Ford, drives it home, and then 
subsequently needs to sell the newly purchased vehicle for reasons 
unrelated to the car. Ford’s personal jurisdiction argument would create a 
situation in which a private purchaser of the “new” vehicle would be unable 
to sue Ford for a product liability defect, despite the total absence of changes 
                                                           
295 Ford Motor Revenue 2006–2020, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/ 
charts/F/ford-motor/revenue [https://perma.cc/T63F-KYDP] (reporting that Ford had 
annual reported revenues of: $156.776 billion, $160.338 billion, and $155.900 billion for 
the years 2016, 2017, and 2018 respectively); see also YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 
20, at 477. 
296 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, administered, and employed 
by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action and proceeding.”). 
297 See supra text accompanying note 291 (describing the costs corporations face with mass 
tort litigation); see also infra text accompanying note 302 (detailing the approximate number 
of defective takata airbags in Ford vehicles which could potentially become instances of 
liability in future personal injury lawsuits). 
298 What is Planned Obsolescence?, FIN. REFERENCE, 
https://www.financereference.com/learn/ planned-obsolescence [https://perma.cc/3WZN-
TMYE] (“Planned obsolescence, premature obsolescence or built-in obsolescence is a 
strategic policy of deliberately producing consumer goods designed to rapidly become 
obsolete, useless and require replacing.”). 
299  Cf. Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 7:08. 
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made to the vehicle after its original purchase from a motor-vehicle 
dealership.300 
In essence, Ford’s rule relating to first sale and proximate cause 
completely eliminates Ford’s liability for vehicles it manufactured once the 
car is sold by a private party.301 This opens a gap in the law and incentivizes 
the company to push for narrower standards for establishing personal 
jurisdiction because it would help Ford dismiss future lawsuits prior to any 
settlement negotiations.302 
Ford argues that “due process limits on the State’s adjudicative 
authority principally protect[s] the liberty of the non-resident defendant not 
the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties.”303 If Ford truly believed in 
their “defendant’s convenience” argument, it could have moved to dismiss 
the matter for improper venue.304 
 Ford is not the first corporation, and it will not be the last to 
advocate for changes to judicial precedent to limit its future liability or make 
                                                           
300 Id. 
301 Cf. id. Justice Clarence Thomas asked Petitioner’s Attorney Sean Marotta whether Ford 
could be sued in a state if a private individual saw an advertisement for a used Ford and 
subsequently purchased it. Marotta stated: “If you bought . . . [the vehicle] from, you know 
just a private party, no. If you purchased . . . [the vehicle] from your local Ford dealer, yes.” 
Id. at 8:40; see also MINN. STAT. § 168.27, subdiv. 8(b)(2) (2020) (exempting private 
individuals who sell or lease five or less vehicles a year from licensure as a Minnesota motor-




302 See Amy Martyn, Ford to Customers: Your Airbag May Kill You, Now Please Wait for 
the Repair, CONSUMER AFFS. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/ford-
to-customers-your-airbag-may-kill-you-now-please-wait-for-the-repair-011818.html 
[https://perma.cc/M2EA-4VWA] (showing that as recently as 2006 Ford had nearly 3,000 
Ford Ranger vehicles that posed as an injury risk to consumers); see also Takata Recall 
Spotlight, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/takata-recall-spotlight [https://perma.cc/G4WS-N6SJ] 
(reporting that there are nearly 57,400,000 defective Takata Air Bags in vehicles across the 
United States, and that the wide-reaching range of impacted Ford manufactured vehicles 
indicates that Ford may be attempting to make it more difficult for injured parties to maintain 
lawsuits against it for injuries sustained in accidents involving defective airbags); Takata 
Airbag Recall, supra note 279 (describing additional makes and models identified as having 
defective airbags). 
303 Reply Brief for Petitioner, Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, 140 S. Ct. 916 (2020) 
(Nos. 19-368 & 19-369), 2020 WL 2133053, at *3 (Apr.  2020) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 
571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)). 
304 Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., No. 77–CV–16–1025, 2017 WL 101185684, at *2 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. May 25, 2017) (describing that Ford was improperly served with notice in an 
improper venue in 2016, but it subsequently moved to voluntarily transfer venue to Todd 
County, where the Hanson Defendants resided, under Minnesota Statute § 542.01 and in so 
doing, it accepted the venue when service of process was amended in 2017); see generally 
MINN. STAT. § 542.01 (2020). 
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it more difficult for an injured plaintiff to have his or her day in court.305 For 
example, in 2017, Microsoft successfully argued to prevent the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals from reviewing the denial of a class action certification 
after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action with prejudice.306 The 
rationale for this decision comes from the Court’s position that a voluntary 
dismissal with prejudice should not be allowed to circumvent the final 
judgment rule as a way to appeal the denial of a class’s certification.307 This 
decision, in effect, makes it more difficult for a class of similarly injured 
parties to challenge the denial of class-action certification at the district court 
level in the event that the appellate court also denies review of class 
certification in accord with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.308 The 
Microsoft decision was ultimately favorable to corporations facing class-
action lawsuits.309  
D. An Unsolicited Suggestion to Resolve the Unintentional Availment 
Concerns 
The answer to whether jurisdiction could be exercised over a local 
manufacturer in Maine310 or a small business that has not intentionally 
cultivated a market in a specific foreign-state can be determined by 
borrowing a legal rule developed in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.311 
Parklane considered the extent to which offensive use of collateral estoppel, 
also known as issue preclusion, could prevent a defendant from relitigating 
facts that had already been determined in a previously closed case.312 The 
Court held that, although the offensive use of collateral estoppel does not 
promote judicial economy, it would not result in unfairness to the defendant 
when the plaintiff could not have easily joined in the previous action.313 The 
Court permits defensive use of collateral estoppel because it precludes a 
plaintiff from relitigating identical issues by merely switching adversaries.314 
                                                           
305 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 13–14; see generally Bandemer v. Ford Motor 
Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 759 (Minn. 2019). 
306 Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1706–07 (2017) (describing that voluntary 
dismissal will not be considered a final decision and will not allow an individual to appeal the 
denial of class certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f)). 
307 See Microsoft Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1706–07; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
308 See Microsoft Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1706–07. 
309 See id.; see also Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Reject Lax Rule Permitting Free 
Review of Decisions Denying Class Certification, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 13, 2017), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-justices-reject-lax-rule-permitting-
free-review-decisions-denying-class-certification/ [https://perma.cc/H3FK-FFNA]. 
310 Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 33:09. 
311 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
312 Id. at 322. 
313 Id. at 322–23. 
314 Id. 
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Meanwhile, the Court granted wide discretion to trial courts to determine 
the permissibility of offensive use of collateral estoppel.315  
Similarly, in Bandemer, the Court can adopt a similar theory 
regarding the application of specific personal jurisdiction, providing district 
courts with wide discretion to determine whether a given foreign defendant 
advertised in the forum state with the intent to cultivate a market or if the 
contacts were merely coincidental.316 The district courts’ adoption of this 
flexible determination would ensure a mechanism exists to satisfy the fears 
Ford raises in its petition relating to small-scale manufacturers being unduly 
burdened by the specific personal jurisdiction doctrine as it presently 
exists.317 Furthermore, the legal rule would help address the concerns voiced 
by Chief Justice Roberts and some of the other Justices relating to small 
business operations that did not consistently market their goods nationally. 
The defensive framework of the rule could relate to the holding in Bristol-
Myers Squibb, preventing non-resident plaintiffs from using a foreign state’s 
court to adjudicate an injury without sufficient plaintiff contacts to the 
foreign state.318 Lastly, it would affirm specific personal jurisdiction in 
Bandemer because Ford does advertise and cultivate a market in 
Minnesota.319   
V. OPPOSING ARGUMENT: MINNESOTA DID NOT 
PROPERLY EXERCISE SPECIFIC JURISDICTION320 
 The holding in Bandemer does not comply with federal due 
process requirements for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction.321 For a 
court to find that a defendant maintains sufficient minimum contacts under 
the Due Process Clause, it must examine the quantity of the contacts with 
the forum state arising from the defendant’s conduct, the nature and quality 
of those contacts, and the connection between those contacts and the cause 
of action.322 
Here, while the quantity of Ford’s contacts is high due to Ford’s 
generic activities in Minnesota, the contacts’ quality and nature, as well as 
                                                           
315 Id. at 331. 
316 See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 747–53 (Minn. 2019); cf. Parklane, 
439 U.S. at 322–23. 
317 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53. 
318 Oral Argument, supra note 275, at 33:09. 
319 See generally Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53. 
320 This section of the analysis is authored exclusively by Kevin Deno. 
321 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931 (2014) (holding 
when both the defendant’s conduct and the underlying controversy lack a forum state 
connection, the court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction). 
322 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (listing the five factors that Minnesota courts must find 
to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a company not in personam). 
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their connection to the cause of action, fall well below what is required for 
the purposes of federal due process.323 These inadequacies stem from three 
deficiencies.324 First, Ford acted through an untargeted marketing campaign 
that merely included Minnesota.325 Second, Ford did not include 1994 
Crown Victorias in its Minnesota advertisements. 326 Third, Ford dealerships 
are independently owned entities.327 
A. Factor One: The Quantity of Contacts between the Forum State and 
the Defendant’s Conduct 
 The facts in Bandemer satisfy the first factor for the minimum 
contact analysis under the Due Process Clause.328 For the contacts to be 
significant, they must extend beyond unilateral activity and constitute 
targeted actions within the forum state.329 Unilateral contact, insufficient for 
jurisdictional purposes, occurs when contacts arise solely from activities 
initiated by plaintiffs.330  
Here, Ford sold around two thousand 1994 Crown Victorias and 
two hundred thousand other vehicles at franchisee dealerships in Minnesota 
from 2013 to 2015.331 Additionally, Ford operated a continuous advertising 
campaign through direct mail advertisements that targeted Minnesotans 
alongside a national advertisement campaign.332 Ford also fabricated a 
branded Mustang for the Minnesota Vikings, hosted a 2016 “Ford 
Experience Tour” in Minnesota, and created a driver training camp for 
Minnesotan teens.333 Finally, Ford collected data from its dealerships in 
                                                           
323 See id. at 748 (listing the facts demonstrating Ford’s contacts including national 
advertisements, general car sales, employees, and data collection practices); Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (finding that a defendant’s 
general connections with a forum state are not sufficient to establish specific personal 
jurisdiction under federal due process). 
324 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748 (analyzing the contacts Ford had with Minnesota 
including advertising, sales, and dealerships). 
325 See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J. dissenting) (arguing Ford acted through an untargeted 
marketing sale which happened to include vehicle advertisements in Minnesota). 
326 See id. at 757 (arguing the Crown Victoria did not appear within Ford’s Minnesota 
advertisements). 
327 Id. (arguing that Ford dealerships in Minnesota were independently owned). 
328 See id. at 749 (stating that the first factor is “the quantity of contacts with the forum state”). 
329 See id. at 751 (“This suit’s connection with Minnesota is beyond ‘the mere unilateral 
activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant’ . . . rather, the 
connection is based on Ford’s own actions in targeting Minnesota for sales.”) (citing World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980)). 
330 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (discussing how the lack of car distribution 
in a tristate area rendered interactions by the defendant unilateral in nature). 
331 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748. 
332 Id. 
333 Id.  
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Minnesota about its customers’ cars for information regarding automobile 
redesign and repair.334 
The facts in Bandemer mirror the seminal personal jurisdiction 
case, International Shoe,335 but are distinguishable from Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and World-Wide Volkswagen.336 First, in International Shoe,337 the 
company’s actions produced substantial interstate business through its sales 
and service providers.338 These activities included employing thirteen 
salespeople within the state who conducted International Shoe’s principal 
business in the state.339 Moreover, the salespeople advertised the company’s 
services by presenting customers with sample shoes and rented sample 
rooms that salespeople used to display the shoes.340 These display areas 
ranged from rooms in business buildings to rooms in hotels.341 Thus, the 
United States Supreme Court declared that personal jurisdiction was proper 
because the company had sufficient contacts with the forum state through 
its salespeople.342 
In Bandemer, Ford had a greater number of contacts with 
Minnesota than International Shoe had with Washington.343 The thousands 
of car sales at Minnesota dealerships alone indicates that the contacts in 
Bandemer exceeded those in International Shoe.344 However, Ford also 
created contacts through driving camps and dealerships.345 Therefore, if the 
contacts of thirteen International Shoe employees in Washington can satisfy 
the quantity of contacts required for the first factor in a minimum contacts 
analysis, then additional contacts, like those in Bandemer, also satisfy the 
first minimum contacts factor.346 
                                                           
334 Id. 
335 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
336 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017); World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. 
337 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (describing activities of salespeople in the forum state, as 





342 See id. (stating personal jurisdiction was proper because of the company’s systematic and 
continuous business in Washington). 
343 See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 2019) (listing Ford’s 
contacts with Minnesota); see also Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (describing International 
Shoe’s activities in Washington). 
344 See Bandemer. 931 N.W.2d at 760 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The fact that Ford sold 
the Crown Victoria and thousands of other cars to dealerships in Minnesota cannot sustain 
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.”). 
345 Id. 
346 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 (finding personal jurisdiction was proper due to the 
company’s systematic and continuous business in Washington); see also Bandemer, 931 
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Thus, given the quantity of contacts, the Bandemer plaintiff’s claim 
satisfies the first prong for minimum contacts analysis.347 Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that Ford did not contest this minimum contacts factor.348 
However, as the Bristol-Myers Squibb Court noted, sufficient contacts with 
the forum state by the defendant cannot outweigh both a lack of connection 
between the defendant and the forum state and a lack of connection 
between the defendant’s forum contacts and the cause of action.349 
B. Factor Two: The Nature and Quality of the Defendant’s Contacts with 
the Forum State 
 Bandemer’s facts do not satisfy the second factor of the minimum 
contacts analysis for purposes of federal due process.350 If the nature and 
quality of the defendant’s contacts correlate with the plaintiff’s alleged harm, 
then a court might be able to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign entity via federal due process.351 More specifically, the quality of the 
connections must not be “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”352 
For its quality analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined 
the same facts as detailed above in this section’s factor one analysis.353 Under 
these facts, the court held that Ford’s contacts were not random, fortuitous, 
or attenuated, but rather a targeted marketing program by Ford in 
Minnesota.354 
However, the court overlooked key facts, which, when combined 
with the preceding facts, illustrate that Ford did not specifically target 
Minnesota.355 First, Ford did not specifically target Minnesota with its 
advertising campaign but included the state in a national, untargeted 
                                                           
N.W.2d at 750 (holding that Ford had a sufficient quantity of contacts with Minnesota to 
satisfy the first prong of minimum contacts analysis). 
347 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (indicating when considering quantity of the contacts, 
the court must examine the contacts alleged by the plaintiff by looking at the totality of the 
facts). 
348 Id. at 751. 
349 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(“For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not 
enough.”). 
350 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (explaining the second factor involves “the nature and 
quality of [the defendant’s] contacts”). 
351 See id. at 748. 
352 See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing the untargeted nature of Ford’s 
advertising and sales due to the absence of any reference to Crown Victorias or their 
fabrication). 
353 See supra notes 330–333 and accompanying text (detailing Ford’s contacts with 
Minnesota). 
354 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 750–51 (majority opinion) (stating Ford purposefully 
availed itself to Minnesota through its marketing, sales, property, and employee contacts). 
355 See id. at 760–62 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
41
Deno and Dees: Personal Jurisdiction: A "Shoe" in Doctrine?—Bandemer v. Ford Co.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2021] PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A “SHOE” IN DOCTRINE? 1205 
advertising campaign that specifically targeted no individual state with 
increased frequency.356 These strategies included national advertising and 
direct mail sent to all Ford consumers regardless of whether they were 
located in Minnesota. 357 Also, Ford created databases that allow all of its 
dealerships to gain information about Ford’s vehicles concerning service 
and repair; these dealerships are all independently owned and operated 
both in Minnesota and across the United States.358 Additionally, Minnesota 
dealerships, along with dealerships throughout the United States, sent Ford 
information about vehicle performance that Ford could use when 
considering future designs.359 However, as the data was for future designs, 
this collection was not related to 1994 Crown Victorias.360 Clearly then, the 
facts describe untargeted efforts by a company that collected and presented 
information to independently owned and operated dealerships in 
Minnesota. This, when considered alongside the facts articulated by the 
court, deeply erodes the quality of Ford’s advertising contacts within the 
state.361 
Furthermore, the court overlooked the origin of the plaintiff’s 
claim, the car’s manufacturing and assembly location, and other factors that 
contributed to the car entering the stream of commerce in Minnesota when 
it considered the nature of Ford’s contacts with the forum state.362 Here, the 
vehicle’s passenger, Bandemer, brought product liability, negligence, and 
breach-of-warranty claims for an injury that occurred when the driver 
collided with a snowplow and the airbags failed to deploy.363 When 
considering these claims, the court should have examined and given weight 
to conduct that either aided in the car’s construction or placed the car into 
Minnesota’s stream of commerce.364 First, the Crown Victoria’s airbag 
                                                           
356 See id. 
357 Id. at 758. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. 
360 See id. (“Ford receives information regarding vehicle performance from ‘across the United 
States, including in Minnesota,’ that may be used when considering future designs.”). 
361 See id. at 750 (majority opinion) (“This minimum-contacts inquiry must ‘look[] to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself’ and not the defendant’s ‘random fortuitous, 
or attenuated’ contacts with ‘persons affiliated with the State.’”) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 
571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014)). 
362 See id. at 757 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing Bandemer’s complaint against Ford as 
containing product liability, negligence, and breach-of-warranty claims); see also id. at 758 
(stating that the Crown Victoria in question was designed in Michigan, assembled in Ontario, 
Canada, sold in Bismarck, North Dakota, and finally registered in Minnesota in 2011). 
363 Id. at 757. 
364 See id. at 759 (“In fact, all of the relevant conduct that frames the basis for Bandemer’s 
claims took place well before the 1994 Crown Victoria was first registered in Minnesota in 
2011 by someone other than the parties to this lawsuit.”). 
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system was designed in Michigan.365 Second, the vehicle was assembled in 
Ontario, Canada.366 Third, the car was originally sold in North Dakota to a 
third party uninvolved in the claim.367 Fourth, another third party, 
uninvolved in the claim and unrelated to Ford, brought the Crown Victoria 
to Minnesota.368 Therefore, while the crash occurred in Minnesota, the 
remaining facts tying the plaintiff’s claims to Ford, all occurred outside the 
state and occurred at least seventeen years before the plaintiff’s claim.369 
Thus, given the evidential weight, the quality and nature of Ford’s contacts 
with Minnesota are poor because Ford’s construction, design, and sale of 
the airbags all occurred outside of the state.370 
Moreover, these facts mirror those found in controlling and 
persuasive cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that specific personal jurisdiction did not apply to the 
seller because the car came to Oklahoma by chance after its sale in New 
York, and the manufacturer made no specific effort to push the car into the 
state.371 Furthermore, courts have reinforced that the happenstance of 
circumstances does not create personal jurisdiction in other cases. In 
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found 
that a state did not have personal jurisdiction over a tire retailer when the 
tire popped while the driver traveled in the forum state.372 In Reilly v. Phil 
Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., a federal court in New Jersey found that a Wisconsin 
seller of defective automotive jacks could not be hauled into a New Jersey 
court simply because the damage occurred in New Jersey.373 A Minnesota 
district court found that Alaska did not have personal jurisdiction over a 
Florida company that sold concession materials when a defective bottle, 
which had been sold in Florida, was carried to and caused injuries in 
Alaska.374 Finally, that same Minnesota court did not find personal 
jurisdiction over a helicopter company when a helicopter sold by the 
company crashed as it traveled through the state.375  





369 See id. (describing Ford’s activities and their relation to plaintiff’s claims). 
370 See id. at 751 (stating that a strong “connection is based on [a company’s] own actions in 
targeting Minnesota for sales”). 
371 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980) (describing 
how a car sold by a corporation randomly ended up in the forum state through no act of the 
company). 
372 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). 
373 372 F. Supp. 1205, 1206–07 (D.N.J. 1974). 
374 Uppgren v. Exec. Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170–71 (D. Minn. 1969). 
375 Id. at 172. 
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Much like these cases, the car in Bandemer arrived in Minnesota 
through similar happenstance.376 The 1994 Crown Victoria was first sold in 
North Dakota and only arrived in Minnesota in 2011, when its fourth owner 
registered the car there—seventeen years after the car’s original sale.377 
Furthermore, Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned and 
operated, and no advertisement by Ford included a Crown Victoria.378 
Therefore, the 1994 Crown Victoria came to Minnesota outside of Ford’s 
control, and Ford directed no advertisements or sales for the car because 
Minnesotan dealerships are independent franchises.379 Accordingly, specific 
personal jurisdiction should not apply because Minnesota courts cannot 
exercise specific personal jurisdiction when the litigation lacks a connection 
between the forum and the controversy.380 
Considering these facts, Ford neither targeted Minnesotans with 
advertisements involving 1994 Crown Victorias, nor sold 1994 Crown 
Victorias to Minnesotans directly, thus undermining the targeting needed 
for specific personal jurisdiction.381 Furthermore, the court failed to consider 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s relevance, where the Court ruled that pills produced 
or consumed outside California failed to establish specific personal 
jurisdiction.382 Here, Ford designed the airbags in Michigan, manufactured 
them in Canada, and did not include the airbags in any advertisements in 
Minnesota.383 Therefore, the connections required for specific personal 
jurisdiction occurred entirely outside Minnesota. The only other 
connections involved the actions of third-party franchise owners, private 
owners, and nationally targeted advertisements. Accordingly, the facts do 
not satisfy the second minimum contacts factor necessary to establish 
personal jurisdiction.384  
                                                           
376 Id. 
377 Id. at 757–58. 
378 Bandemer v. Ford Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 758 (Minn. 2019) (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
379 See id. (“It is undisputed that Ford dealerships in Minnesota are independently owned and 
operated.”). 
380 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(noting personal jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum state and the 
underlying controversy). 
381 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (requiring 
some sales or other services). 
382 Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
383 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
384 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating general connections with the forum 
are not enough to create specific personal jurisdiction). 
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C. Factor Three: The Connection of the Defendant’s Contacts to the 
Cause of Action 
 Finally, Bandemer’s facts do not satisfy the third minimum-
contact factor as the defendant’s contacts lack any connection to the cause 
of action.385 If the cause of action is sufficiently connected with the 
defendant’s contacts, then the facts satisfy a personal jurisdiction analysis.386 
Conversely, as noted in Walden v. Fiore, “mere injury to a forum resident 
is not a sufficient connection to the forum” to establish personal 
jurisdiction.387 
In Bandemer, the court again overlooked relevant facts that 
undermine its finding of personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s product 
liability claims.388 Since these claims directly involve the airbag of a 1994 
Crown Victoria, the court should have analyzed the car’s manufacture and 
design.389 The airbag’s construction occurred outside of Minnesota and 
seventeen years before the accident giving rise to the case.390  Therefore, 
while these actions may relate to the plaintiff’s claims, they arose both out-
state and many years prior. 
Furthermore, the evidence does not support the conclusion that 
Ford’s data collection practices created a sufficient connection to the 
plaintiff’s claim.391 The Bristol-Myers Squibb Court stated that a company’s 
undertaking of matters within the forum state, but unrelated to the claim, 
are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding whether to subject a company 
to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction.392 Here, Ford’s data 
collection practices involved taking data from independent dealerships for 
the development of future cars, which does not involve 1994 Crown 
Victorias.393 Ford’s engineers stated that the information collected from 
these dealerships did not influence the design of the 1994 Crown Victoria.394 
Because contemporary data collection practices do not affect the design of 
                                                           
385 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 749 (“(3) the connection of the cause of action with these 
contacts.”). 
386 Id. 
387 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). 
388 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d. at 757–58 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (discussing the car’s 
construction and sale and Ford’s advertising efforts within Minnesota). 
389 See id. at 758 (stating the plaintiff’s “strict liability claim alleges that Ford ‘designed, 
manufactured, advertised, marked, tested, inspected, furnished, sold, and distributed’” the 
car). 
390 Id. 
391 See id. at 759 (describing Ford’s data collection from independently owned and operated 
dealerships for future car designs). 
392 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
393 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The engineer in no way 
indicated that Minnesota data influenced the design . . . of the Crown Victoria.”). 
394 Id. 
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a 1994 Crown Victoria’s airbags, Ford’s practices do not have a connection 
with the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the data collection practices are 
irrelevant and insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.395 
While Ford did conduct some advertising that specifically targeted 
Minnesotans, these actions do not satisfy the connection test required by 
Bristol-Myers Squibb.396 Here, Ford led its “Ford Experience Tour,” 
manufactured a Ford Mustang for the Minnesota Vikings, hosted a teen 
camp, and sponsored many athletic events in Minnesota.397 However, none 
of these undertakings specifically referenced a 1994 Crown Victoria or its 
airbags.398 Also, Ford’s advertising efforts from the mid-2010s did not 
contribute to development of the 1994 Crown Victoria. Therefore, because 
Ford’s specific actions in Minnesota do not reference the plaintiff’s claim, 
they are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding if Minnesota can exert 
personal jurisdiction over Ford as dictated by Bristol-Myers Squibb.399 
Additionally, in its advertisements, Ford did not display the 1994 
Crown Victoria or its airbags, which destroys the requisite connection 
between Ford’s actions and the plaintiff’s claim to support personal 
jurisdiction.400 In Rilley, the court agreed with numerous other courts that if 
a company’s advertising campaign is purely national in scope and is not 
directed at the forum state, then the advertising does not support personal 
jurisdiction.401 Here, Ford conducted national advertising campaigns 
through direct mail and other means that reached Minnesotan markets.402 
Ford made no unique efforts to target Minnesota through its national 
marketing. Therefore, the advertising campaigns cannot support specific 
personal jurisdiction. 
Given these advertising conditions, Bandemer is distinguishable 
from Rilley’s holding.403 In Rielly, while a payday loan company advertised 
through a national campaign that did not specifically target Minnesotans, the 
                                                           
395 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. 
396 See id. (stating general connections with the forum are not enough to create specific 
personal jurisdiction). 
397 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748. 
 
398 Id.at 760 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
399 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating a company’s undertaking of matters 
within the forum state unrelated to the claim are insufficient and irrelevant when deciding if 
that company is subject to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction). 
400 See Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 321, 333–34 (Minn. 2016) (“[N]umerous 
other courts . . . have rejected purely national advertising as a contact supporting personal 
jurisdiction because such activity is not purposefully directed at the forum state.”). 
401 Id. at 337. 
402 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748. 
403 See Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at 325 (describing how MoneyMutual’s advertising violated 
Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes by exceeding the maximum allowable APR). 
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company used its ads to attract Minnesotans to its specific service.404 Its 
advertisements also directly referenced the service.405 Conversely, Ford did 
not voluntarily or specifically target Minnesotans with advertisements 
featuring the 1994 Crown Victoria. Rather, its national marketing was 
indiscriminate, the car was not featured in any of Ford’s advertisements 
targeting Minnesota, and the model was not in the information collected by 
dealerships.406 Moreover, none of the camps, sponsorships, or other specific 
actions involved a 1994 Crown Victoria.407 Accordingly, Rilley and 
Bandemer can coexist under the same rule. 
In sum, Ford neither targeted Minnesota with advertisements 
featuring Crown Victorias, nor directly sold Crown Victorias to Minnesotans 
through corporate sales, making personal jurisdiction is inappropriate.408 
Furthermore, the court failed to consider Bristol-Myers Squibb’s holding 
that pills produced and consumed outside California were insufficient to 
confer specific personal jurisdiction.409 Similarly, Ford designed its airbags 
in Michigan, manufactured them in Canada, and never once advertised 
them in Minnesota.410 Therefore, the connections required for specific 
personal jurisdiction occurred entirely outside Minnesota, and personal 
jurisdiction cannot be established.411 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Bandemer court considered a motion to dismiss the claim for 
lack of personal jurisdiction.412 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined 
that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because sufficient minimum 
contacts existed between Ford and the forum state.413 However, it is possible 
the Minnesota court erred in recognizing existing Supreme Court precedent 
                                                           
404 Id. at 337. 
405 Id. at 325. 
406 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (stating that defendant’s actions must be 
intentional, expressly targeted at the forum, and done with knowledge that the forum state’s 
plaintiffs would feel the injury’s strain); see also Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 750 (listing Ford’s 
contacts with Minnesota). 
407 Id. at 757. 
408 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980 (requiring 
some sales or other services). 
409 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
410 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
411 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (stating that a company’s undertaking of 
matters within the forum state but unrelated to the claim are insufficient and irrelevant when 
deciding if that company can be subjected to the forum state’s specific personal jurisdiction). 
412 Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 747–53 (majority opinion). 
413 Id. at 755. 
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that Ford met the requirements for specific personal jurisdiction in the first 
place.414  
In its holding, the court argued that its application of decades-old 
minimum contacts analysis was consistent with established precedent in 
determining personal jurisdiction.415 There are also important policy 
considerations to this holding as businesses have proven they will use all 
methods available to them to limit their own liability, whether this means 
advocating for changes through lobbying or litigation.416 Moreover, 
businesses in the age of e-commerce utilize personal data to help promote 
and tailor advertisements in an increasingly personalized manner. As a 
result, courts should freely grant specific personal jurisdiction to help ensure 
that grievances are heard in a timely manner and to promote the efficiency 
of the courts. Not only that, in the age of e-commerce, the vast majority of 
challenges to personal jurisdiction brought by defendant-corporation will 
border on frivolous and constitute nothing more than a cynical effort to 
leverage the financial resource imbalances between the parties, which 
contravenes the goals laid out in the very first Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure.417 
However, it is possible that the Bandemer court wrongfully 
permitted the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction under Minnesota’s 
long-arm statute.418 Federal due process requires that a defendant maintain 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, as determined by the 
contacts’ quantity, nature, quality, and relevance.419 Ford’s contacts with 
Minnesota may fail to satisfy the requirements of minimum contact analysis 
since Ford neither specifically marketed its 1994 Crown Victoria in 
Minnesota, nor purposefully collected data from Minnesotans with an eye 
towards the car’s development.420 While the court found conduct sufficed to 
establish jurisdiction, Ford argued that its actions were, instead, untargeted, 
indiscriminate, and foreign to Minnesota which indicated contact short of 
what is required under a minimum contacts analysis.421 Therefore, it is 
                                                           
414 See supra Part V. 
415 Id. at 750–55. 
416 See supra Section IV.C.2. 
417 See supra text accompanying note 8. 
418 See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 744 (Minn. 2019) (discussing how Minnesota courts could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Ford due to the plethora of the company’s contacts with 
the forum state); supra Part IV. 
419 See id. at 749 (listing the factors required by due process to determine specific personal 
jurisdiction). 
420 See id. at 759 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (describing the nature of Ford’s contacts with 
Minnesota). 
421 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(holding that a company’s connection with the forum state must constitute more than general 
connections to satisfy minimum contact analysis). 
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unsurprising that Ford petitioned the United States Supreme Court for 
certiorari. 
The United States Supreme Court granted Ford’s petition for a writ 
of certiorari and held oral arguments on October 7, 2020.422 Ford argued for 
the adoption of a causal relationship standard for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.423 In contrast, Bandemer posited that adopting Ford’s 
proposition would transition personal jurisdictional analysis into something 
more akin to tort law’s proximate cause standard.424 As mentioned, the 
Court rendered a decision on March 25, 2021, holding that Ford was 
properly subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and 
Montana.425  
                                                           
422 See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 211; OYEZ, supra note 211; Oral Argument, supra note 
275. 
423 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 212, at 15. 
424 Brief for Respondents, supra note 213, at 10–12; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
212. 
425 Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court et al., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 
1032 (2021) (holding that the connection between the claims and Ford’s in state activities 
were sufficient for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction in both Minnesota and 
Montana).  
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VII. APPENDICES 
A. Appendix: Ford Pass Loyalty Program Privacy Policy and Terms426 
 
                                                           
426 FORD, supra note 229 (detailing Ford’s terms and conditions of the FordPass Loyalty 
Program and the Privacy Policy provisions of the EULA has been screen captured for 
posterity). 
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427 Id. 
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C. Appendix: Ford Pass Loyalty Program Privacy Policy Continued428 
 
                                                           
428 Id. 
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